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1. Motivation 
 
When we began our project though we might have had various interpretations most of 
us shared a common idea of the meaning behind the word humanism. The most 
common assumption was that it had something to do with being kind to your fellow 
man and treating other people with respect and benevolence. We soon came to realize 
that behind the term lies a complicated concept dealing with many aspects of human 
nature. 
The word humanism is applied in many different contexts; it is used in contemporary 
political, religious, ethical and philosophical matters and traditionally has been 
assigned a positive value.  
One might also wonder to whom humanism has meaning, considering that the ethical 
approach and traditionally positive values applied to the concept of humanism, has 
evolved primarily in the rich western world, even though humanism claim to deal 
with universal conditions for all humans? Another question which presents itself is 
whether it is at all possible for a concept to say something general about humans and 
at the same time include them all however different they may be? 
Why is that? What is humanism and what does it mean to be a humanist? 
It is questions like these that have arisen in the process of writing our project and 
questions of this kind suggest a philosophical interpretation.  
We have chosen into the depth with three works of Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin 
Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer, since all three have written texts concerning humanism 
at a very critical period in recent history, namely right after the Second World War. 
 
The three philosophers have different takes on the subject and all three have their 
own individual idea of what it means to be human. In analysing the chosen texts 
written by the three philosophers and looking into the background and history of 
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humanism in general, one realizes that humanism have meant different things to 
different people in different times and have changed several times through history. 
The sheer number of areas which have been connected with the concept of humanism 
makes one raise the question if there even exist any areas of human activity which 
can not be connected with humanism, and does humanism consequently have any 
meaning at all? 
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2. Problem definition 
 
‘Humanism’ seems to be a very vague and diverse expression, yet primarily positive. 
Most people of today seem to have an idea of what humanism is and what it means to 
be a humanist. People might actually be better at pointing out whom and what is not 
humanism, and furthermore what it means to be inhumane. 
By analyzing three philosophers; Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre and Ernst 
Cassirer, one gets an idea of different perspectives on humanism. These three 
philosophers each formulates how man should consider himself and relate to his 
reality.  By taking relevant arguments from each of the three philosophers and discuss 
them we might be able to find some common ground from which it will be possible 
for us to discuss what humanism is today. 
 
• Is humanism a coherent concept?  
                  -   How does each of the three philosophers describe humanism? 
-   Is there a coherency if their humanisms relate to each other?  
 
• Are we able to formulate a common denominator for humanism? 
- Is there a common denominator for the three philosophers’ way of      
                     interpreting humanism? 
 
• Is it possible to relate each of the three philosophies today? 
- Can we, in 2005, relate to the threes philosophers’ view on                  
     humanism? 
 
By asking the above questions we are lead to our cardinal question: 
Are we able to determine a foundation for humanism on the basis of our reading 
Cassirer, Heidegger and Sartre?  
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3. Delimitations 
 
To allow ourselves to expand on the cardinal question and go into the depth with our 
main area of interest, we had to limit ourselves by omitting some otherwise relevant 
issues and literature. Humanism touches upon so many different disciplines that if we 
had pursued every idea which we had come across during our many discussions and 
debates throughout the process, our project would have covered a lot of ground, but 
none of it in depth. 
 
1. Even though the philosophers in this assignment in all probability have been 
influenced strongly by the effects of the Second World War, we will not go into 
depth with this historical perspective because of the following reasons:  
1.2 We will keep the main focus on the philosophies themselves.  
1.3 The history perspective is a project in itself. 
2. We will also avoid getting into some of the categories the concept of humanism is 
normally being applied to because it is too broad in the perspective of what we are 
trying to do. These include the ethical aspect of the concept which would be an 
obvious entrance to the subject taking normal connotations into consideration. 
3.1 We will not go into the depth with the philosophers’ influences. Aware that each 
of the philosophers base their own philosophies on a long tradition of philosophy and 
therefore will draw intertextual references to their main influences we had to take into 
consideration both how to keep focus on the subject humanism, and how to avoid an 
overload of information. 
3.2 Also, we will not go in depth with other works of the three philosophers unless it 
is crucial for the understanding of what we are trying to stress. As an example we will 
draw in some material from Sartre’s main work Being and Nothingness. This is 
because Sartre bases his defence of Existentialism is a Humanism on Being and 
Nothingness. 
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4. Knowing that there has been written loads of material on the subject we are also 
aware that we cannot in any way get to reflect upon all of the material and have 
therefore chosen primary to base our project on three philosophers: Sartre, Heidegger 
and Cassirer. 
 
 7 
4. Method 
 
Our project is of a personal character, meaning that our conclusion consists of 
personal reflections. These reflections are based on the way we have examined the 
works i.e. analysis, interpretation of and involvement with the philosophers as an 
attempt to answer our problem. We concentrate on the “view upon man”, and do not 
reflect much upon the “after-effects” or historical consequences of their philosophies, 
but we consider the over all idea about the concept humanism. 
 
We have divided our project into three main parts: 
 
1. Reconstruction: we analyse what the philosophers say about humanism and 
their view upon man. 
2. Deconstruction: we put the philosophers up against each other in order to find 
differences and equalities. 
3. Construction: we go back to the question on humanism with renewed insight 
and discuss it, taking a starting point in our problem definition. 
 
We have focused on a single piece of literature from each of the three philosophers 
concerning humanism as our primary source of literature. We have read and used the 
Danish versions for our own understanding of the many difficult terms and 
expressions and we have used the English versions mainly for quoting. Furthermore 
we have supplemented with the original versions (French and German) to provide the 
original translation for various philosophical terms and concepts specific to the 
individual philosophers. 
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5. The concept of humanism: A brief introduction 
 
The concept humanism has its origins in ancient Greece where the thought, that man 
is independent from cosmos can first be found with the Greek philosopher 
Protagoras’s “Homo mensura” sentence “Man is the measure of all things”. App. 
485-415 B.C. 
Christian humanism (Middle-Ages app. 500-1400) stressed that man could go beyond 
humanity through God. Historically, humanism is referred to as a designation for the 
humanistic current in Europe. The word humanism takes it point of departure in the 
Latin humanus – humane1.  
That which is human, has been combined with transcendence, meaning that what is 
really human goes beyond humanity.  
As a rejection of the religious humanism, Renaissance humanism (1400-1600) turned 
away from medieval scholasticism (1100-1500), which attempted to reconcile the 
philosophy of the ancient classical philosophers with medieval Christian theology. 
Renaissance humanism revived interest in ancient Greek and Roman thought, i.e. 
man is not dependent on God. Rather than being a miserable sinner awaiting 
“redemption from a pit of fleshing corruption”2, man was a source of infinite 
possibilities3. The Greek and Roman thought was based on the antic ideal of man, 
that man has the capability to become a “universal-human” – a complete human 
being. Humanism was not dependent on authorities because man was now guided by 
his own common sense (sensus communis), judgement and taste. Thus it is every 
man’s right to become a complete human through a development in freedom and 
moral responsibility.  
The role models for this kind of life were the great thinkers and writers of the 
Antiquity. They became the authorities whom man could identify himself with, 
                                                 
1
 In this case in meaning of the Danish: Menneskelig and the German: Menschlich  
2
 Encyclopedia Britannica Online, Date: 27-11-05 
3
 The words and terms in bold in this section are highly valued in the “definition” of humanism. 
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contrary to the political and religious authorities. This kind of identification (Lat.: 
imitation, classical rhetoric) meant: profitable knowledge gained from great role 
models, not: mindless imitation of political and religious authorities. The profitable 
knowledge i.e. common sense, judgement and taste lead to worldly sense enjoyment, 
self esteem and tolerance.  
The secular thinking viewed man as a creating centre for human phenomena. In the 
15th century the studia humanitatis dealt with the human phenomena. The study 
consisted of grammar, poetry, rhetoric, history and moral philosophy. It was 
influenced by the Roman philosopher Cicero (106-43 B.C.) who translated the Greek 
paideia (“liberal” education; pais = pupil) to the Latin humanitas. Man must 
surrender himself to edification, matureness, balance, patience, and become 
civilized.4 It emphasized a development of human virtue, in all its forms, to its fullest 
extent. The focus on human virtue led to a renewed interest especially in rhetoric. 
Man must become a rhetor, a man of style. Classical virtue, in examples of which the 
literature abounded, was not an abstract essence. It was a quality that could be tested 
in the forum or on the battlefield of discussion. Classical literature was rich in 
eloquence. Politeness and civilized conduct was part of the “universal-human” 
image. 
The Renaissance Humanism was the greatest flowering humanism and spread 
through the whole of Europe. 
The concept of humanism becomes more established in 1800Germany. Humanism is 
formed as a philosophical educational theory5 and a rationalistic outlook or system of 
thought. The German educationalist Friedrich I. Niethammer invents the word 
“Humanismus” in 1808. Humanism becomes the norm man must use to accomplish 
edification6 of his individuality. Edification thereby means total harmony of the 
                                                 
4
 In the sense: not animal-like 
5
 Danish: Dannelsesteori 
6
 In this project we will use edification as the Danish: Dannelse and the German: Bildung. 
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human activities and the medium of edification is language. New humanism also sees 
the ancient Greece as a role model for perfect edification.  
In the 20th century New humanism is reshaped and focuses more on man’s concrete 
and historical conditions of life. Classical-idealistic humanism is a critical reshaped 
New humanism but is still a theory of edification. 
In the beginning of the 20th century the classical-idealistic New humanism is being 
criticized by the young Karl Marx. Marx’s humanism becomes a critical humanism, 
which criticizes inhumane conditions in the working class. Thus Marx applies a 
social dimension to humanism. Humanism stresses the potential value and goodness 
of human beings, emphasize common human needs, and seek solely rational ways of 
solving human related problems. 
WWI in 1914-1918 undermined the role of individuality, because of the massive 
industrialized warfare. Man’s individuality disappeared in the shadows of the 
meaningless war. As a result of the surreal period, the autonomy of the individual 
emerges. Pacifism and autonomy are added to the humanism. 
Then came the depression and the reign of fascistic regimes grew all over Europe, 
throwing the world into to another all-embracing world war in 1939-1945. In the 
aftermath of the war people questioned humanism and the role of humanity. Non-
violence conduct was a natural reaction for a lot of people.  
Today man is faced with the coming of big business as the major presence in the 
world. Man is often considered more as a consumer than as a citizen. With the 
coming of big business emerges the demand of amusement vs. the antique thought of 
introspection.  
The historical retrospective shows that the concept of humanism has been 
continuously expanding. This helps to clarify what kind of concept we are dealing 
with today.  
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6. Historical dimension 
 
6.1 Time and place  
All of the texts we use in this project are from the same historic era, namely the last 
years of the Second World War and the aftermath.  
The texts were published in respectively 1944 (Ernst Cassirer, An essay on man), 
1946 (Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, based on a lecture held in 
1945) and 1946 (Martin Heidegger, Letter On Humanism). 
The war demanded roughly 51 million casualties both military and civilian. In Europe 
the German Nazi regime had been leading the biggest ethnical genocide in world 
history causing the death of 6 million Jews and several million Slavic and other 
minorities. 
In the Far East the Americans dropped two nuclear bombs over Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki causing the lives of 120.000 people, among them only 5% were military 
casualties. 
Man’s role in the world was questioned. How could one talk about humanism? And 
if, which humanism would that be when the world had just experienced 7 years of 
war and suffering? 
 
6.2 The Three Philosophers – A Short Introduction 
Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) was a German philosopher and acted as a professor at 
several German universities. However, Cassirer being a Jew, was forced to emigrate 
from Germany after Hitler and the NSDAP seized power in Germany in 1933. After 
the political change of regime he worked on Oxford (1933-1935) and Gothenburg 
University (1935-1941) before he found himself forced to leave and emigrate to the 
United States of America. He worked at different universities until his death in April 
1945. 
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The later Cassirer, whom we are dealing with, mainly concerned himself with 
semiotics i.e. the study of signs and symbols and their correlation with individuals 
and in groups. He invented a universal philosophy of culture and symbols in which he 
tried to emphasize the function of the symbols in everyday life, science, religion and 
art.  
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) was also a German philosopher. In the period we are 
concerned with he occupied himself with the relationship between ontology and 
metaphysics, which he sought to deconstruct. 
Heidegger acted as a lector on different German universities until he became the 
rector of Freiburg University the 21st of April in 1933. Heidegger joined the NSDAP 
in 1930, according to himself because he did not see any other way of keeping his 
academic life going.  
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) was a French philosopher and generally credited as an 
existentialist. It is in his role as existentialist we find him in Existentialisme Is a 
Humanism. Sartre graduated form the prestigious École Normale Supérieure in 1929 
with a doctorate in philosophy. At the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 
Sartre was drafted in to the army were he served until he was captured by the 
Germans in 1940. He was sent out of his imprisonment in 1941 and then became a 
member of the French resistance. 
Sartre was strongly influenced by Heidegger, especially by Heidegger’s thoughts on 
the human existence and “the anguish of modern society, to the individual’s 
confrontation with his own temporality.”7 
Another matter which is essential to our project is that Sartre was influenced by 
Descartes.8 
                                                 
7
 http://www.bartleby.com/65/he/Heidegge.html Date: 22/11-05 
8
 http://www.geocities.com/sartresite/sartre_influences2.html Date: 23/11-05 
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7 Reconstruction 
 
In this section we will reconstruct the main argumentation. The idea of this project is 
to describe humanism, as the expression is quite puzzling to us. Our purpose with this 
chapter is to get a precise idea of each philosopher’s description of humanism. In the 
end of each section we will give a critique of these descriptions.  
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7.1 
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) 
Existentialism Is a Humanism 
 
The 29th of October 1945, five months after the capitulation of Germany the 8th of 
May 1945, the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre held a public lecture in Club 
Maintenant in Paris. The title of the lecture was: Existentialism is a Humanism9, and 
it was published under the same name in 1946. 
The lecture was a sold out event and had been announced in every major newspaper 
in France. 
The major attention produced by this lecture reminds one of contemporary rock 
concerts or major political events like the G8 summit.  
The content of the lecture sent waves through Europe and affected both intellectuals 
and the general public.  
In the following presentation we are going to present the main argumentation line 
presented by Sartre.  
 
7.1.1 Existence comes before Essence 
We will start presenting the premises for Sartre’s philosophy. 
Classic positions like teleological metaphysics10 and rationalism have typically 
claimed the following11: 
 
1) God exists. 
2) God is an omnipotent, omniscient creator (technical view). 
                                                 
9
 French (Fr) L'Existentialism est un humanism. 
Sartre uses the pronoun un (a) in the title because he acknowledges that there exist different interpretations of the 
concept. 
10
 In this project the assumption that all things have a purpose given by God. 
   Poul Lübcke, Politikens Filosofi leksikon 
11
 Sartre, Jean-Paul Existentialism is A Humanism, pp. 348-349 
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3) God knows precisely what he is creating. 
4) God creates man according to a certain conception or idea. 
5) Thus mans essence comes before his existence.  
 
Accordingly the conception of an essence of man is derived by the concept of God 
i.e. God as the creator of mans essence. However Sartre is an atheist and rejects the 
first premise (God exists) and as a logical consequence of this the argumentation line 
breaks down. As a consequence the traditional argument for essence as conditional to 
existence collapses. In his lecture on Existentialism is a Humanism (EH) Sartre 
claims the following12: 
 
1) God does not exist. 
2) Consequently man does not posses a preordained human nature since there is 
no God to have a conception of it. 
3) Thus mans existence comes before his essence. 
 
To understand Sartre’s argument we should briefly look at his theory of 
consciousness, which is fully articulated in his main philosophical work Being and 
Nothingness (BN). Sartre’s description of the consciousness is central to his 
conclusion that existence comes before essence and therefore a proper reconstruction 
of the argument is introductory to an account of his existentialistic humanism. 
 
7.1.1.1 Being and Nothingness 
In BN Sartre uncovers two ontological categories being-in-itself and being-for-itself. 
Being-in-itself involves all the things in the world, which do not possess 
consciousness. Being-for-itself hereby differs because it possesses consciousness and 
can relate to things in the world and to itself, which makes a certain self-relationship 
                                                 
12
 Ibid. p. 349 
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in the consciousness, which to a high degree provides the breeding ground for the 
following arguments by Sartre in BN: 
 
“…at the point of departure there cannot be any other truth than this, I think, 
therefore I am, which is the absolute truth of consciousness as it attains to itself. 
Every theory that begins with man, outside of this moment of self-attainment, is 
a theory that thereby suppresses the truth, for outside of the Cartesian cogito, all 
objects are no more than probable, and any doctrine of probabilities that is not 
attached to a truth will crumble into nothing. In order to define the probable one 
must possess the true. Before there can be any truth whatever, then, there must 
be an absolute truth, and there is such a truth which is simple, easily attained and 
within the reach of everybody; it consists in one’s immediate sense of one’s 
self.”13 
 
The description of the two categories differs from most traditional (Anglo-American) 
philosophy in the 20th century. Man is thrown into the world, which means that Sartre 
moves the problem from an epistemic level to a description of the relationship 
between man and the things. We should therefore only understand Sartre’s notion of 
the cogito as the consciousness’ sensation of itself and not as a res cogitans14 from 
where we can raise the question concerning the existence of the outer world. The 
existentialistic notion is rather that the consciousness is already and at all times 
committed in the outer world: 
  
                                                 
13
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism Is a Humanism p. 360-361 
14
 “A thinking thing.”  
René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy pp. 65-66 
 17 
”The first procedure of a philosophy ought to expel things from consciousness 
and to re-establish its true connection with the world, to know that 
consciousness is a positional consciousness of the world”15  
 
Here Sartre explains the consciousness’ commitment in the world as a positional 
relationship. The concept of the consciousness’ intentionality was first developed by 
Edmund Husserl16 who described, in his phenomenology, the consciousness as 
transcendence17 which means that the consciousness is already among the things and, 
as such, in an immediate relationship with the being. 18 As man is thrown into the 
world the consciousness has no causal relation but occur accidental in being-in-it self 
and as being-for-it self the consciousness projects meaning to being-in-it self. Sartre 
describes the act to uncover meaning as a negation, which is illustrated in his 
example with Pierre19: We have planned to meet our friend Pierre at a café. In our 
expecting to meet Pierre the intentionality of the consciousness creates a context of 
meaning in which the being of the things appears. As we step into the café seeking 
Pierre the inventory of the café synthesizes with “the presence of Pierre” i.e. the 
things are organized around our expectation of meeting Pierre. However the things 
themselves do not yield our expectation of meeting Pierre. This expectation is the 
meaning we ourselves project to the world. Sartre points out that this projection of 
meaning is a negation of the being since the things do not have any meaning 
themselves.  
However Pierre is not present in the café. Only due to our expectation of meeting 
Pierre, Pierre appears as absent. The café itself, with its chairs tables and costumers 
do not yield any sense of absence.   
                                                 
15
 Jean Paul Sartre, Being & Nothingness p. 7 
16
 Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (1859-1938). Philosopher who is credited as the father of phenemology, which will 
be explained further down. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Husserl Date: 27-11-05 
17
 Sartre, Jean-Paul Existentialism Is A Humanism pp. 368-369 
18
 Poul Lübcke, Vortids filosofi: Engagement og forståelse pp. 43-44 
19
 Jean Paul Sartre, Being & Nothingness p. 33 
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The consciousness is an act of nihilation, which constantly negates and projects 
meaning into the world, which is regarded to be a contingency20 fluctuating between 
being and nothingness. Sartre points out that man brings nothingness to the  world. 
But what does it mean that the consciousness is fundamentally nothing?  
 
7.1.1.2 The consciousness as freedom 
The consciousness is to be understood as two-dimensional i.e. as 1. an immediate 
sensation of something, which is the condition for 2. the sensation of the 
consciousness itself as doing this sensation. This is expressed in what we called 
being-for-itself. On one hand we can count the stars in the sky and on the other we 
can experience ourselves as counting the stars in the sky. The consciousness’ 
sensation of itself renders our projection of ourselves beyond our present situation 
possible. In projecting ourselves beyond our present situation we are at the same time 
negating or saying “NO!” to what is given i.e. our present situation. We are not 
caught up in a certain development that we cannot deviate from. In other words 
Sartre’s radical indeterminism tells us that nothing in our present situation can be 
decisive for what we will be in the future. Our present situation can therefore not 
yield a foundation from which we can derive our future situation. The consciousness 
exists continuously in a gap of nothingness between our present selves and our future 
selves.21 We can now explain the continuous act of nihilation of the consciousness’ 
structure as freedom.   
We can also return to EH and Sartre’s argument and view it in the light of this new 
premises. If it is true that the consciousness, as thrown into the world, is nothingness 
in the sense that it is an act of nihilation of the given then it will also be true, that 
whether or not God exists we are free of any predetermined human nature. And thus 
                                                 
20
 In this paper we use the term to describe status of facts that are not logically necessary.  
Http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contingency Date: 27-11-05 
21
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being & Nothingness p. 9 
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existence comes before essence. We exist first of all as an undefined variable and we 
are only what we make of ourselves. This is the first principle of existentialism.22 
 
7.1.2 Project & Commitment 
Sartre rejects the concept of a universal essence i.e. a human nature. Instead he 
describes an inter-subjective universality in form of a set of universal conditions i.e. 
man as abandoned and condemned to freedom. With the concept of abandonment 
Sartre draws the full consequence of the absence of God. If we reject the existence of 
God we must also reject the values and guidelines that are founded on the concept of 
God. Sartre claims that without a God and a universal human nature we will never be 
able to a priori justify any values or prescriptive rules that can tell us what to do23. 
However as we have seen we can negate the given states of affair and thereby stand 
in relation to the possible i.e. we are free to choose or plan our essence. We are in 
other words characterized by transcendence and possibility rather than a given 
essence. Freedom is therefore not freedom from outer restraints but freedom to 
choose our own essence in every situation. This is what Sartre explains to be a 
project. The project is Sartre’s conception of an authentic and valuable life in a world 
full of contingent being-in-itself: 
 
“First I ought to commit myself and then act my commitment, according to the 
time-honoured formula that “one need not hope in order to undertake one’s 
work.” Nor does this mean that I should not belong to a party, but only that I 
should be without illusion and that I should do what I can.”24 
 
                                                 
22
 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism Is A Humanism p. 349 
23
 Ibid. p. 353 
24
 Ibid. p.358 
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By this doctrine Sartre declares that there can be no reality other than that in action. 
This is how Sartre, understand the concept of despair25, which in this notion is quite 
simple. It says that we can only rely upon that which is within our wills, or within the 
sum of the probabilities, which render our action possible.  We should act with no 
hopes. Hopes are only illusions. We are nothing else but what we purpose. We exist 
only in so far as we realise ourselves, i.e. our project, and we are therefore nothing 
else but the sum of our actions. The authentic existence is, as such, to be understood 
as a committed and devoted project that constitutes a specific reality. In this view 
Sartre’s existentialism becomes a philosophy of action and self-commitment. 
 
7.1.3 Choice, Responsibility & Angst 
As we mentioned in the beginning EH was a lecture that sought to defend 
existentialism against the criticism raised by Marxists and Catholics. The common 
denominator in their critique was that BN confines man to a radical subjectivism that 
leaves no foundation for an ethics. There are two notions of the existentialist 
subjectivity; one is the understanding of mans absolute freedom which means that 
neither inner (e.g. a human nature) or outer (e.g. God) factors have influence upon 
our choices nor can we rely on these. Sartre’s concept of freedom entails that we are 
completely responsible for everything that we are and everything we do. The 
responsibility is absolute and the choice is crucial to our existence. The other 
understanding of subjectivity depicts us as isolated and unable to reach out beyond 
our own subjectivity. This is the one notion that Sartre seeks to rescue existentialism 
from as he asserts that we are not only responsible for ourselves but for all men: 
 
“(...) Of all the actions a man may take in order to create himself as he wills to 
be, there is not one which is not creative, at the same time, of an image of man 
such as he believes he ought to be. To choose between this or that is at the same 
                                                 
25
 Ibid. p. 357 
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time to affirm the value of that which is chosen; for we are unable ever to 
choose the worse. What we choose is always the better; and nothing can be 
better for us unless it is better for all.”26 
  
Choice is, according to Sartre, unavoidable: Even in trying to avoid making a choice, 
we do still choose in our not choosing. 
Furthermore Sartre claims that the choice implies universality. 
 “When we (existentialists) say that man chooses himself, we do mean that every one 
of us must choose himself; but by that we also mean that in choosing for himself he 
chooses for all men.” 27   
 
Sartre’s argumentation line for this universality of choice is as follows: 
1. Through our choices we create an image of man, as we believe he ought to be. 
2. Man always chooses what is of value to him – man can never choose the worse 
over the better. 
3. The choice then becomes universal because “(…) nothing can be better for us 
unless it is better for all.”28 
4. Thus our choice is based on an image of man as he ought to be, our choice then 
is not only for us but for everyone. 
 
When realizing that the universality of the choice, being a legislator of ones actions, 
one must necessarily feel “(…) the sense of complete and profound responsibility.”29 
When a person commits himself to something through a choice he is not only 
choosing for himself but at the same time he is a legislator deciding for the whole of 
mankind. In such a moment, Sartre explains, man cannot escape the sense of angst30.  
                                                 
26
 Ibid. p. 350 
27
 ibid.  
28
 ibid.  
29
 ibid p. 351 
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Angst is not fear from God or some other outer factor. Angst is metaphysically a part 
of the choice. Angst is fear from nothingness, which means that the individual person 
is entirely alone and responsible for his own actions. 
With the concept of angst we get closer to a definition of the choice. On one hand 
Sartre seeks to dispute all ethical propositions i.e. he challenges or encourages the 
individual person to reflect upon what is right and wrong and to take responsibility 
for that decision. And as we mentioned in the latter section, Sartre tries on the other 
hand to avoid subjectivity by asserting that we are obliged at every instant to perform 
actions, which are examples for other people.   
 
7.1.4 Existentialism is a Humanism 
Sartre’s existentialism is nothing else but an attempt to draw the full conclusions of a 
consistently atheistic position. Opposite to Being and Nothingness his intentions in 
Existentialism is a Humanism are not to plunge man into despair. The concepts of 
“despair”, “angst”, and “abandonment” are developed in relation to certain positions 
like Christianity - if by despair we mean any attitude of unbelief. The despair of the 
existentialists is something very different. Despair is rather a doctrine of action and 
commitment. It is only in constantly projecting and pursuing transcendent aims that 
we are able to exist and live an authentic life. This relation of transcendence as 
constitutive of man (not in the sense that God is transcendent, but in the sense of self-
surpassing) with subjectivity (in such a sense that man is not shut up in himself but 
forever present in a human universe) – is what Sartre calls existential humanism.  
 
“This is humanism, because we remind man that there is no legislator but 
himself; that he himself, thus abandoned, must decide for himself”31 
                                                                                                                                                                  
30
 In the French version Sartre uses the word Angoisse. Angoisse is translated to the English anguish. We have chosen 
to use the philosophical term angst for two reasons: 1. In philosophy one uses angst instead of anguish. 2. Because 
Sartre refers to Kierkegaard when explaining Angoisse.    
31
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Not like classic humanism, which according to Sartre bases itself upon man’s 
greatness “man as the end-in-itself and the supreme value”32 (this he claims will lead 
to idolatry, and in its utmost consequence to fascism), existentialism is rather a 
reminder that there is no other legislator but man himself. 
Sartre’s philosophy is an ontological description of the consciousness and its relation 
to the things and other people. In depicting this relationship Sartre uncovers being in 
a world without a God. God is just one of many concepts that Sartre either rejects or 
gives a new meaning and it is liberating how Sartre deconstructs the usual values that 
are often and unreflected being used in public debate. We must remember that the 
point of departure for existentialistic atheism is to show that nothing is given prior to 
our existence. The popular assertion “existence comes before essence” shows us, that 
in religion and science we find a construction that seems to have forgotten that man’s 
existence is the foundation for a description of the being. Sartre’s philosophy is an 
attempt, to uncover the human being solely from the perspective of the human 
subjectivity. All religious and scientific categories are human constructions, which 
tries to cover up the contingency of life in an arbitrary world. 
 
7.1.5 Problems in Sartre’s existentialism 
We have mentioned that Sartre sought to defend existentialism against the criticism 
raised by Marxists and Catholics. Their critique was focused on the radical 
subjectivism, which is the result of Sartre’s theory of the consciousness:  
 
“And at the point of departure there cannot be any other truth than this, I think, 
therefore I am, which is the absolute truth of consciousness as it attains to 
itself.”33 
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We have also said that existentialistic subjectivism can be understood in two ways: 
 
i) Subjectivism as the absolute freedom to choose our own essence in 
every situation, which means that neither inner (e.g. a human nature) 
or outer (e.g. God) factors can be decisive in our choice of project. 
ii) Subjectivism as solipsism. This is the notion that Sartre wants to 
avoid. 
 
1. Does the individual responsibility imply a universal responsibility? 
Accordingly Sartre claims that we can deduct a universal responsibility from our 
individual responsibility (which is the implication of our absolute freedom). 
However, it is difficult to see how this inference is possible: The concept of a 
universal responsibility analytically implies that our choice of project is dependent 
upon outer factors i.e. other people.   
 
2. Does existentialism yield a foundation for an ethics? 
The definition of freedom as absolute freedom to choose our own essence in every 
situation excludes, as we have mentioned, the formulation of any prescriptive rules, 
which may help us live an authentic life (e.g. Sartre’s friend who consults him 
whether he should join the Free French Forces or stay with his mother.)34 If Sartre 
doesn’t overcome this problem he is faced with the following traditional problems of 
ethical subjectivism:35 
 
a. What is morally a right action to an agent does in fact not make the action 
morally right: An SS officer can from the perspective of subjectivity morally 
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justify the genocide of 10 million Jews. Killing Jews is a morally right action 
to an SS officer as long as he is committed and devoted. This would also be 
true to a devoted SS officer if he, himself, was the Jew  
 
b. Subjectivism often involves ethical relativity: norm x is true to A and norm y is 
true to B but x and y are incompatible. Ethical relativity cannot regard one 
action over another as morally more preferable since it asserts that all ethics are 
correct relative to their position or culture. The perspective implies an 
acceptance of grotesque moral norms: “It is morally acceptable to torture an 
infant”.  
 
3. Does Sartre’s existentialistic humanism imply a definition of the human being? 
Sartre disputes any theory that offers a definition of the human nature but is 
existentialism itself in fact a theory on the human nature i.e. the universal human 
circumstance as an abandoned and condemned project? It seems that Sartre’s 
existentialism is just another ontological definition that presents itself in the history 
of philosophy. In our examination of this question we look into the critique presented 
by Heidegger and the French sociologist Naville.  
Another apparent problem is that existentialism rejects every social or natural science 
that places man in a social environment with a psychological, biologic structure. 
Traditionally we assume that man, like any other object in relation to its 
surroundings, is exposed to a causal network that shapes us as individual persons. 
Sartre however tries to create a philosophy that explains man as an absolute subject 
rather than an object and consequently claims that the existentialistic commitment or 
choice is the only thing that matters. 
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7.2 
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) 
Letter on ‘Humanism’ 
 
In autumn 1946 the German philosopher Martin Heidegger wrote Letter on 
‘Humanism’36 as a reply to his friend Jean Beaufret37. Jean Beaufret was a teacher in 
a French grammar school (lycée). He had through the years of the war mainly been 
influenced by Sartre’s existentialism and as he said himself did not understand a word 
of Heidegger’s work Was ist Metaphysic?38 He wrote a letter to Heidegger in which 
he posed three questions39. In his answer Heidegger chose to focus on the question on 
how to restore the meaning of the word humanism. The exchange of letters happened 
just after Sartre’s lecture Existentialism is a humanism, in which Sartre speaks on 
behalf of Heidegger as an existentialist, and thereby a humanist.  
In the following presentation we will try to create an overview of Heidegger’s main 
points and concepts. To get an insight of Heidegger’s point of view on the concept 
humanism, sentences in Letter on Humanism must be carefully analysed, understood 
and used to draw connections between his main issues.  
In Letter on Humanism Heidegger guides the reader through his many poetic and 
original concepts towards the idea that all former humanisms have underestimated 
man’s position among other beings. But through his thinking he comes up with 
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thoughts that he proposes could lead to a whole new understanding of humanism.  
 
7.2.1 Thinking, Being and Man’s situation 
Instead of an introduction Heidegger creates a springboard that on one and a half 
page throws the attentive and careful reader into the very core of his thinking 
concerning man’s situation. “Language is the house of Being. In its home man 
dwells.” 40 This sentence on the first page is the metaphor containing Heidegger’s 
main concepts on man’s situation. 
 
“To accomplish means to unfold something into the fullness of its essence, to 
lead it forth into this fullness – producere. 41 Therefore only what already is can 
really be accomplished. But what” is” above all is Being. Thinking 
accomplishes the relation of Being to the essence of man.”42 
  
Heidegger explains that in existence man completes what he is. What man is is 
accomplished through his thinking and Being which unites the very essence of man. 
Essence will be explained later because thinking is the main word when explaining 
man’s history in relation to Being and essential in Heidegger’s critique of humanism 
as metaphysics.  
According to Heidegger “Thinking is engagement by Being for Being”.43 When 
analysing the sentence it occurs that Being is both the subject that acts and the object 
that the acting concerns. To this problem Heidegger points out that “In this regard 
“subject” and “object” are inappropriate terms of metaphysics(…)”44 The 
engagement by Being for Being is the pure thinking - the essence of thinking. But in 
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order to carry it through “we must first free ourselves from the technical 
interpretation of Being.”45  
This technical interpretation is the interpretation of thinking as a process of reflection 
in service for doing and making.  
 
7.2.2 The main concepts of Heidegger 
To proceed, it is necessary to introduce some of Heidegger’s concepts. Heidegger has 
invented his own words and concepts as a way to separate his description of man’s 
situation from the metaphysical. Through those neologisms he removes the basis of 
humanisms other than the one he proposes. The concepts are all active in the 
description of man. With this description Heidegger adds a new perspective to the 
debate about humanism, in that he puts man in a new role in relation to all the other 
beings.  
 
• Being (Ger: Sein) 
Firstly a distinction between at one hand being as what is to us, which is the same 
as entities, and the being/Being in its original form, as a substantive deduced from 
the verb “is”, meaning that there are just as many senses of being/Being as there 
are senses of “is”. The distinction between being and Being is a part of Kant’s 
philosophy adopted by Heidegger and is essentially about a distinction between 
how the being appear/is to us and how it is in itself (Ger: Das Ding an sich). All 
beings/entities have a Being in themselves, and a being as the way they appear to 
us. In this sense Being can be conceived as every possible way of appearing. 
Heidegger’s big issue is what Being is in itself, “Being as such”. Being is not to be 
understood as a static unrevealed “thing out there”, but as ever changing. 
Whenever something happens, Being in itself changes.  
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• There-being (Ger: Dasein) 
Dasein is basically, and explained in a simple way, the being that can only exist 
by relating to its existence. 46 The German word Dasein means in English there-
being. The purpose of there/Da is to emphasize, that man is in the existential 
situation where he can only exist when he is open to Being. It is a mistake to think 
that the forms “I”, “consciousness” and “subject” can interpret the entities 
independently of the fact, that they are already embedded in the very same they 
are interpreting, always already there in the midst of it.  
 
• Openness (Ger: die Offenkeit) 
In Dasein’s situation openness is the condition for experiencing the truth of Being. 
By Dasein’s openness to Being we can reach the most original phenomenon of 
truth.  
 
• Truth of Being (Ger: die Wahrheit des Seins) 
The truth of Being is the process within man’s relation to Being, where the truth of 
Being is concealing and revealing itself.47 Unconcealment (Ger: Unverborgenheit) 
is Being showing itself, i.e., the truth of Being. An experience of the truth of Being 
could be described as when something that is not intended occurs to one. That is, 
when the thought acts by itself and not as an instrument for an intended acting.  
 
• Ek-sistence (Ger: Ek-sistenz) 
This concept is not to be seen in relation to existence, but as the ecstatic in man’s 
way of being. Ecstatic is derived from the Latin form ecstasis, which means being 
out of stasis, not standing still. Heidegger writes: ”In terms of content ek-sistence 
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means standing out into the truth of Being.”48 Language is according to Heidegger 
what preserves man’s ek-sistence.  
 
• Language (Ger: Sprache) 
Heidegger does not conceive language to be the expression of a living entity.49 
Language speaks by saying, i.e. speaking is the hearing of language that lets 
saying be said to it. What is most important is, that it is the house of Being itself. 
“In language the difference between Being and entities lies.”50 There is a 
distinction between in language and with language. “To ask about – what is the 
world – with language is to seek for an answer that can only be given in 
language.” 51 Metaphysics cannot cross this border and ask in language. This 
means, that with language, language is used as a tool and in language, language 
itself speaks. Speaks, i.e. brings forth what was not before. Man ek-sists in 
language, not with language. In language he belongs to the truth of Being, 
guarding it. Whereas animals are in the truth of Being, we have language and are 
therefore not in the truth of Being, but can interpret the truth of Being. “(…) 
language is at once the house of Being and the home of human beings.”52  
 
• Lighting of Being (Ger: Lichtung des Seins)  
Lighting of Being53 is the ‘there’ in the ‘there-being’. The ‘there’, is where man 
can only exist if he is open to Being. Here Being shows itself as something which 
is true. Man is therefore in this openness to Being constantly interpreting the 
Being of the beings including man’s own.  
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• Care (Ger: Sorge, Da: optagethed/kymren sig om) 
In the concept care Heidegger puts together the different modes of Dasein, i.e. the 
concepts mentioned below. These modes are the Being of Dasein, and are:  
1. Always already being in a situation with given circumstances. (Ger: 
Befindlichkeit).  
2. The passive awareness of this through moods, e.g. angst, Heidegger calls 
thrownness54 (Ger: Gevorfenheit)  
3. Understanding of the situation with the given circumstances. (Ger: Verstehen) 
4. A reaction on the understanding of the situation, a throwing oneself, as a 
counter reaction to the thrownness. (Ger: Entwurfen) 
In other words the Dasein is throwned thrownness (Ger: Entwerfendes 
Geworfenheit, Da: Kastende kastethed). This is Heidegger’s purely descriptive 
account for man’s “being in life”, where of course religious people would tend to 
see it as a gift.   
 
7.2.3 Metaphysics/ontology and the history of Being 
Before going into what Heidegger more specific says in the letter we think it is a 
good idea to introduce the relation between metaphysics and ontology because they 
are essential in his view upon humanism. 
Historically metaphysics has been divided into:  
1. Ontology: term for the study of being. 
2. Epistemology: the study of nature, origin, and limits of human knowledge.  
The word ontology was in the 17th hundred synonymous with metaphysics but took 
form as the study of being because metaphysics came to include other studies (e.g. 
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philosophical cosmology and psychology).55 According to Heidegger metaphysics is 
a special kind of ontology, but however it is not pure ontology. The distinction lies in, 
what he calls the ontological difference, which is the difference between Being as 
such and the being of entities.56 Within metaphysics the Being has not been in focus, 
but beings/entities. We have concentrated on how the beings/entities appear to us, 
and not their Being i.e. how they appear in themselves. What has happened in the 
history of metaphysics is that metaphysics has moved further and further away from 
the question of Being, which is: - What is Being? Instead of posing this question 
metaphysics has based itself on the concrete Being of entities/beings. Metaphysics 
has through the history reduced Being to perceivable beings. Its understanding of to 
be has been identified as “to be present as an object for all possible experiences.”57 
Two concepts of metaphysics are existence (existentia) and essence (essentia). They 
relate to each other in the sense that existence is actuality as opposed to possibility, a 
relation which is based on the metaphysical interpretation of Being as actus and 
potentia.58  
When taking Heidegger’s statements into account, “that only what already is can 
really be accomplished, and that what “is” above all is Being (…)” this opposition 
disappears. The essence comes of what “is” and the interpretation of essence as 
possibility is therefore not adequate. This view upon essence is crucial, because the 
essence understood in terms of accomplishment of Being, consists of Being. 
Therefore it makes sense to talk about a History of Being. This hidden process that 
determines history is conceived as “(…) the experience of the transformations of the 
relations between human beings and Being.”59 The history of philosophy 
(phenomenological ontology) begins according to Heidegger with the Greek 
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philosophers Anaximander, Heraclites and Parmenides, who named the 
unconcealment (truth) of Being “alètheia,” but could not think of the truth of  “(…) 
Being in its ontological difference to the being of entities.”60  
The history of metaphysics begins with Plato and Aristotle where Being becomes the 
beingness61 of entities and truth becomes correctness. Metaphysics finds its height in 
G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophy of the absolute entity and its end in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of the will. We now live in the age of nihilism that is determined by the 
will to power and technology.62 In Letter on Humanism Heidegger mostly focuses on 
technology, which is the final result of the history of metaphysics.  
When it comes to existence Heidegger uses a sharp distinction between what 
something is (its necessary properties), and that it is (its existence). And because man 
exists in a special way, Heidegger reserves the word existence for man’s specific way 
of being.  
 
7.2.4 Critique of the word humanism 
Jean Beaufret asks the following question: ”How can we restore the meaning to the 
word ‘humanism’?”63 
Heidegger’s opening comment is that he wonders whether that is necessary. It is just 
one more of the –isms demanded by the public opinion. He writes that: “Even such 
names as “logic”, “ethics” and “physics” begin to flourish only when original 
thinking comes to an end”64 and “Thinking comes to an end when it slips out of its 
element.”65 As well as the following sentences: ”The element is what properly 
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enables: the enabling. It embraces thinking and so brings it into its essence”66 and 
“From this favouring Being enables thinking”67, shows that Being is the element of 
thinking and that thinking of Being brings thinking into its essence. 
 
“Yet Being – what is Being? It is itself. The thinking that is to come must learn 
to experience that and to say that. Being – that is not God and not a cosmic 
ground. Being is farther than all beings and is yet nearer to man than every 
being, be it a rock, a beast, a work of art, be it an angel or God. Being is the 
nearest. Yet the near remains farthest from man.”68 
 
Heidegger here determines where Being is posited in relation to man. Meaning that 
man is farthest away from Being because it is something that man does not fully 
understand and yet it is the biggest part of man and therefore the nearest.  
  
“(…) Language under the dominance of the modern metaphysics of subjectivity 
almost irremediably falls out of its element. Language denies us its essence: that 
is the truth of Being. (…) If man is to find his way once again into the nearness 
of Being he must first learn to exist in the nameless. (…) Before he speaks man 
must first let himself be claimed again by Being, taking the risk that under this 
claim he will seldom have much to say.”69 
 
In this claim, that means if man comply the claim, a concern about man is implied. 
To Heidegger this concern is an actualization of care. In the following sentence 
Heidegger tells, what role “care” plays in relation to Dasein:  
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“As ek-sisting, man sustains Da-sein in that he takes the Da, the lighting of Being, 
into ‘care’”.70  
This means that as the one who can only be in relation to his existence and therefore 
is ecstatic in the sense that he is in an ecstatic inherence in the truth of Being, man in 
his ek-sistence sustains the fact that he is, since he takes the Being of the way he 
sustains, that he is, into care.  
So in that care means man sustaining what he is by interpreting Being in his thrown 
thrown-ness, care “…describes the sundry ways I get involved in the issue of my 
birth, life, and death, whether by my projects, inclinations, insights, or illusions. 
“Care” is the all-inclusive name for my concern for other people, preoccupations with 
things, and awareness of my proper Being.“71 
 
7.2.5 New meaning to humanism? 
This also explains that care includes the way man is towards his surroundings which 
is implicit in Heidegger’s determination of humanism:  
 
“For this is humanism: meditating and caring, that man be human and not 
inhumane, “inhuman”, that is, outside his essence. But in what does the 
humanity of man consist? It lies in his essence.”72  
 
This means that humanism consists of what lies in man’s essence, which is of cause 
not the metaphysical concept of essence, but: 
  
”What man is – or, as it is called in the traditional language of metaphysics, the 
“essence” of man – lies in his ek-sistence. But ek-sistence thought in this way is 
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not identical with the traditional concept of existentia which means actuality in 
contrast to the meaning of essentia as possibility.”73 
 
So ek-sistence is the key to what man is, and thereby the key to humanism. Heidegger 
writes about the Christian humanism and the humanisms of Sartre and Marx. But “… 
in the form of their teaching they nonetheless all agree in this that the humanitas74 of 
homo humanus is determined with regards to an already established interpretation of 
nature, history, world and the ground of the world, that is, of Beings as a hole.” So it 
follows that because we take this interpretation of humanism to be the true one, that: 
 
“Every humanism is either grounded in a metaphysics or is itself made to be the 
ground of one. (…) Metaphysics closes itself to the simple essential fact that 
man essentially occurs in his essence, where he is claimed by Being. Only from 
that claim “has” he found that wherein his essence dwells. Only from this 
dwelling “has” he “language” as the home that preserves the ecstatic for his 
essence. Such standing in the lighting of Being I call the ek-sistence of man.”75  
 
So it is the metaphysical humanisms Heidegger opposes to because they are not able 
to ask about the truth of Being. He could have stopped at this point pushing 
humanism aside as a metaphysic dragging man farther and farther away from his 
essence. Instead he poses the question, of whether the thinking of man’s ek-sisting 
position in the lighting of Being is a humanism?  
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7.2.6 Shepherd of Being 
”Man is not the lord of beings. Man is the shepherd of Being.”76 And as the shepherd:  
 
“Man does not decide whether and how beings appear, whether and how God 
and the gods or history and nature come forward into the lighting of Being, 
come to presence and depart. The advent of beings lies in the destiny of Being. 
But for man it is ever a question of finding what is fitting in his essence which 
corresponds to such destiny; for in accord with this destiny man as ek-sisting has 
to guard the truth of Being.”77  
 
This means that in man’s ek-sistence he is destined in the history of Being. Therefore: 
“…in the determination of the humanity of man as ek-sistence what is essential is not 
man but Being.” 78 
By this interpretation of man Heidegger does not reject the other interpretations of 
man as false. It is a question of realizing the proper humanitas of man. ”Humanism is 
opposed because it does not set the humanitas of man high enough.”79 Because the 
humanitas that man is the lord of beings is not as high as the humanitas Heidegger 
conceives man to have. Heidegger does not believe man’s present view upon himself 
to be set high enough, and therefore to some extent excludes him from guarding the 
truth of Being. But at the same time he proposes, that humanism should be given a 
new meaning, namely his meaning: man as the shepherd of Being, guarding the truth 
of Being. And the truth of Being comes to us as the unspoken. “For thinking in its 
saying merely brings the unspoken word of Being to language.”80 
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7.2.7 Problems in Heidegger 
 
7.2.7.1 Ontology 
According to Sartre the world in itself is meaningless and absurd and man’s relation 
to it is a constant subjective projection of meaning. Many of Sartre’s problems occur 
only as he derives the description of the being/entities from the subjectivity of man.  
Heidegger does not have the same problems as his description of the relationship 
between man and the being takes its starting point in his ontological difference 
between Being and the being. This basic premise, on which Heidegger builds his 
philosophy, is both a strong point, because all of his argumentations are based on it, 
and a weak point, because it stands and falls with this concept. If one does not 
recognize that the question “what is Being in itself?” can be asked, this person would 
not find Heidegger’s description of man relevant.  
Heidegger’s thoughts about man are purely phenomenological and thereby he does 
not connect man with society. As he says, the ‘essence’ of man as ek-sisting is at 
stake, because we to a larger and larger extent think technically. Thinking slips out of 
its element. This is his perspective to society. We should learn to exist in the 
nameless i.e. we should not say anything before we are claimed by Being, i.e. 
language says. Heidegger is perfectly aware, that man in this case will seldom have 
much to say. But his thought will be in the element of Being and he will be more 
open in his interpretation of what he is, i.e. his essence. This humanism in its full 
content is radical and difficult to imagine fulfilled “in practice”. Society as we know 
it would be radically renewed but Heidegger does not utter anything about the 
consequences of his humanism.  
 
7.2.7.2 Use of language 
As Heidegger himself points out, his philosophical project is not describable in 
ordinary philosophical terms, and must therefore present itself through metaphors and 
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neologisms, e.g. ek-sisting, Geworfenheit. Critique on, whether his language can be 
justified depends entirely on, whether one thinks his project can justify it. But when 
one has become familiar with Heidegger thoughts through Heideggers terms, it is 
hardly possible to know whether this familiarity could have been achieved through 
other terms.  
 
7.2.7.3 Humanism 
Although Heidegger just proposes, that if humanism should be given a new meaning 
it should be with his determination of man, this proposal is not, as far as we can see, 
in Heidegger’s “true spirit”. Humanism is after all still an –ism.81 Heidegger writes 
that such –isms step in only when original thinking comes to an end. This of course 
seems inconsistent. However, Heidegger’s complex humanism were not and is not 
likely to become a broad, popular one as the interpretation of Sartre’s existentialism 
came to be. Then what is the purpose? Maybe by proposing his view upon man’s 
situation, and how he must reconsidder the claim, i.e. that he shall guard the truth of 
Being, it is just another way of breaking down the other humanisms by creating a 
non-public comprehendible –ism and leave the public opinion with none? Anyway - 
Heidegger differs significantly from Cassirer who states, that we are in the middle of 
the humanistic project he calls humanism and does not take a stand; he just describes.  
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7.3 
Ernest Cassirer (1874-1945) 
An Essay on Man 
 
We will explain the philosophy of Ernst Cassirer in his work An Essay on Man and 
give an account for his concern with psychological, ontological and epistemological 
questions. The account contains a description of four major concerns which 
according to us describe Cassirer’s philosophy in a well-arranged way.  
The four concerns are; the crisis of the human culture, the idea of unity, animal 
symbolicum and the circle of humanity. The description of the four philosophical 
ideas points out Cassirer’s considerations in making a philosophy of culture. One 
should keep in mind that Cassirer is convinced that the human culture is not just 
fortuitous facts. He wants to disprove such view on human culture by describing, 
what may seem as diverse and heterogeneous subjects within human culture. The 
description will reveal homogeneity in the cultural subjects. The subjects of human 
culture will be explained later as the circle of humanity. We will return to this 
concept. 
 
7.3.1 Methodology 
In the method Cassirer uses to formulate his ideology he bases on the utterances of 
other philosophers. By constantly comparing with and commenting on these other 
philosophical ideas, his ideology becomes very clear. He uses other philosophers' 
statements to emphasize his own standpoint. This he does by presenting many 
different opinions and ideas from various people. Hereby he creates an images or a 
whole of his own ideology, which is not only based on philosophical concepts. He 
takes in many empirical considerations and all in all leaps in many directions to cover 
his own field. This gives both many angles and a broad picture. He gets quite a large 
perspective on his own conception of man through these other opinions. Each section 
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is built up on chronological historical references where the particular subject 
(language, art, science, religion and myth, which are also the subjects which we refer 
to as symbols) is explained in such a relation. Since there are all these aspects, he 
divides his text into parts, each with a different first hand view on his own idea e.g. 
that man is a symbol creating creature. Through several quotes that he comments on, 
throughout the whole book, he puts his idea in perspective. He argues for his idea on 
man by comparing and drawing lines between his own perceptions and what in 
general has been said on the concept of man.  
These symbolic issues has basis for the present question concerning our attempt to define 
our role in the world. Cassirer has by his methodological division of each concept made 
clear comparisons between them; this is why the historical approach to his idea makes 
sense, because the parallels are emphasized in an utmost structured manner. 
 
7.3.2 The crisis of the human culture  
Cassirer wants to tidy up the philosophical thoughts that deal with the problem of 
man. The problem of man82, or the definition of man, has formed a basis for “anarchy 
of thoughts” 83. The philosophical theories concerning the question, “what is man?” 
are incoherent. Philosophy has been overloaded with academic results, containing 
diverging solutions to the problem.    
 
“Our technical instruments for observation and experimentation have been 
immensely improved, and our analyses have become sharper and more 
penetrating. We appear, nevertheless, not yet to have found a method for the 
mastery and organization of this material. When compared with our own 
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abundance the past may seem very poor. But our wealth of facts is not 
necessarily a wealth of thoughts84.” 
 
Cassirer makes an overview of the intellectual development man has gone through. 
The development accounts for historical turning points and alterations. In the first 
cosmological descriptions of the universe man was a part of mythology and therefore 
not a subject for speculation. Later there is a shift of cognition orientation.  
The cosmological thinking is replaced by religious dogmas. Cassirer explains the 
intellectual development in the epistemological speculations on man by making a 
historical overview of the changing focuses. Later the mathematical thinking claims 
to have found an answer to the question, what is man? It replaces the religious dogma 
of God with a rationalistic mathematical sense. The biological thinking takes over 
with a theory based on Darwin’s “The Origin of Species” which is based on empirical 
evidence. Man is a part of evolution. The development of the philosophical thinking 
shows that the metaphysical systems become more and more refined, empirical but 
also introspective85. 
The different branches of knowledge and research are ramified.  
 
“Unless we succeed in finding a clue of Ariadne to lead us out of this labyrinth, 
we can have no real insight into the general character of human culture; we shall 
remain lost in a mass of disconnected and disintegrated data which seem to lack 
all conceptual unity86.” 
 
Cassirer compares the growing amount of facts with a labyrinth, because all 
explanations diverge and all answers to the problem of man are conflicting. The 
research of the human culture and the human nature, are controlled by the fact that 
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the individual philosopher claims to hold “l’idée maîtresse87”, but there is no 
common point of orientation. The lack of orientation and the conflict of ideas are a 
serious theoretical problem and a threat to cultural and ethical living according to 
Cassirer88. But the confusing labyrinth can be added a way out. The answer to the 
thoughts of anarchy is not to reject the material, but to find coherency and unity.  
 
7.3.3 The idea of unity 
”Man’s outstanding characteristic, his distinguishing mark, is not his 
metaphysical or physical nature – but his work. It is this work, it is the system of 
human activities, which defines and determines the circle of humanity. 
Language, myth, religion, art science and history are the constituents, the 
various sectors of this circle89.” 
 
Cassirer wants to find unity in extensive material and it is exactly in the extensive 
knowledge on the human nature, he takes his starting point. But instead of 
investigating the different results, theories, productions, he investigates action. 
Cassirer means that the action of bringing out results and theories is a unique 
character trade of the human nature. Work is not characterized, as in a societal matter, 
because animals share the same ability to work and to create complicated social 
organization. It is in an emotional matter. The extra dimension of thought and 
emotion90, as in art, religion, music and etc, characterizes human work. Cassirer 
claims that it is within the action, and not within the result of the action, one can 
discover the characteristics of human nature, because the results are opposing, 
conflicting and point in different directions. Furthermore he stresses that the 
definition of man cannot be found in the use of physical and metaphysical principles 
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only. Man is by definition not only a metaphysical creature, nor can man’s innate 
abilities or instincts be verified only through empirical observation. Cassirer 
describes the thoughtful and emotional work of man as the circle of humanity91.  
The circle of humanity consists of the humanistic disciplines: language, myth, art, 
religion science and history. It is within these disciplines Cassirer wants to find 
coherence and unity. 
 
“A philosophy of man would therefore be a philosophy which could give us 
insight into the fundamental structure of each of these human activities, and 
which at the same time would enable us to understand them as an organic whole. 
Language, art, myth and religion are not isolated, random creations. They are 
held together by a common bond92.” 
 
It is important to structure the human production and not reject it, because the human 
production is important and useful. According to Cassirer we need the terminology 
and the methods93. We can use the terminology and the methods to find the harmony 
in the productions, even though the production is opposing, and the human culture is 
dynamic94. In the understanding of the productions as an organic whole one will 
discover the coherency, a common bond. The common bond can help the disciplines 
to be cooperative on the methods. What ties the disciplines together (the common 
bong) is the symbol, because man is a symbol producing being.  
Cassirer does not answer the question, “what is man?”, using only physical and 
metaphysical principles, he defines man as animal symbolicum95  Using the 
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disciplines of  the circle of humanity to structure the production of symbols, the 
human culture can come to a “dialectic unity, a coexistence of contraries96.” 
 
7.3.4 Animal Symbolicum 
The symbol is for Cassirer the absolute main issue for interpreting the human 
acknowledgement i.e. a philosophy on man. Earlier man was described as an animal 
rationale. This, Cassirer points out, is not a correct label. Naturally, he agrees that 
man is rational, an ability which he refers to as “an inherent feature of all human 
activity.”97 But to Cassirer this description is not sufficient to explain what the 
essence of man is. He argues that religion, language, history and art are the symbolic 
forms we use to get an understanding of ourselves.  
 
“Reason is a very inadequate term with which to comprehend the forms of 
man’s cultural life in all their rich ness and variety. But all these forms are 
symbolic forms. Hence, instead of defining man as an animal rationale, we 
should define him as an animal symbolicum. By so doing we can designate his 
specific difference and we can understand the new way open to man – the way 
to civilization.” 98 
 
These different disciplines are essential since any attempt to make a philosophy on 
man must be based on these forms. By saying that the forms99 are to be understood 
and interpreted in a symbolic way, them being symbolic, he concludes that man 
therefore must be defined as an animal symbolicum. This is his starting of point and 
the foundation, which his entire book is based upon100.  
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The actual words animal symbolicum implies that man is an animal; an animal 
creating symbols. Opposite to other animals, human beings have reached a new kind 
of reality dimension. The reality dimension can be defined as the human ability to 
reflect upon himself and his surroundings. In present days, Cassirer says, man has to 
some extent been depraved by this ability. Naturally, this leads to the main issue, i.e. 
the use of the symbol, because Cassirer says that in order to cope with the fact that 
we have reached so far beyond any other animal’s capability of thinking, we need the 
symbolic system. 
 
“The functional circle of man is not only quantitively enlarged; it has also 
undergone a qualitative change. Man has, as it were, discovered a new method 
of adapting himself to his environment. Between the receptor system and the 
effector system, which are to be found in all animal species, we find in man a 
third link which we may describe as the symbolic system.” 101 
 
 Because, as Cassirer sees it, there was a “natural order” in our life before evolution 
complicated our minds to such a degree that we became superior to other species. He 
interprets this process in an almost negative manner, saying that: “it is not an 
improvement but a deterioration of human nature to exceed the boundaries of organic 
life.102” Again this is the reality dimension mentioned earlier which we can draw into 
perspective. Because, the things man is surrounded by are the symbolic forms: art, 
religion, history, etc, i.e. the reality dimension. He explains how we are now 
entangled in a web, which consists only of symbols.  
 
“Man cannot escape from his own achievement. He cannot but adopt the 
conditions of his own life. No longer in a merely physical universe, man lives in 
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a symbolic universe. Language, myth, art and religion are parts of this universe. 
They are the varied threads which weave the symbolic net, the tangled web of 
human experience.”103 
 
Since man lives in a world of symbols, but still defines himself as an animal 
rationale, then, according to Cassirer, he is not able to specify his actual role in the 
world. Ergo, living in symbols, humans must think in symbols and therefore take 
starting point in a definition of man as a symbolic animal. 
 
7.3.5 The circle of “humanity” 
The circle of Humanity is a bond of symbols through which one can describe the 
common features in the different activities of man. The symbol, Cassirer says, is a 
component, which is not in fact ‘real’ yet it helps man to understand the world around 
him. If man did not create these symbols there would be no dynamics from which 
development could come.  
 
7.3.5.1 Science 
 
 “The facts of science always imply a theoretical, which means symbolic, element. 
Many, if not most, of those scientific facts which have changed the course of the 
history of science have been hypothetical facts before they became observable 
facts.”104 
 
Cassirer continues by describing how Galileo conceived the idea of an entirely 
isolated body, which was not influenced by external forces. This has or will never be 
seen in nature and Galileo did not at all have an argument that was neither evident 
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nor natural. Nonetheless, without these conceptions, Galileo would have never been 
able to prove his theory of movement.  
 
7.3.5.2 Language 
Language is a system consisting of symbols and is itself a symbol. Through language 
children seem to explore their world and very early on in their life have a broad 
understanding of the context of whatever language they speak.  
 
“It (the child) uses words or sentences that it never has heard and that are 
infractions of the morphologic or syntactic rules. But it is in these very attempts 
that the child’s keen sense for analogies appears. In these he proves his ability to 
grasp the form of language instead of merely reproducing its matter. The 
transference of language from one generation to another is, therefore, never to 
be compared to a simple transfer of a property by which a material thing, 
without alerting its nature, only changes position.”105 
 
Language evolves through time in its spoken and written form with variation from 
generation to generation. Language is an inheritance from each generation to the next 
and is ever changing, developing new words and sentence structures, the meaning of 
others is put to a new value and some terms are even altered in their essential 
connotation. 
An excellent view of the development in human culture is also given by looking at 
language philosophy in which the central activities are etymological. The 
philosophers search for the origin of words and investigate the circumstances under 
which words have developed.  
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“We must trace our terms back to their origins if we are to detect the bond uniting 
them with their objects. From derivative words we must go back to primary 
words; we must discover the etymon, the true and original form, of every term.”106 
 
7.3.5.3 Religion 
Religion is also a system of symbols, Cassirer says, yet he does not provide an exact 
sentence or quote that ultimately proofs this statement. What one can observe is the 
way he describes religion as a tradition that develops constantly through history. 
From the constraining nature of mythological religions, religious beliefs have taken a 
more and more individualized direction. Though missing a definite description of 
religion as a symbol from Cassirer one can, nonetheless, conclude from his 
description of the nature of this development that religion is not at all static and that 
the dynamics have an obvious relation to all other activities of man because religion 
has always been a constituting fact in human culture. Therefore it is natural that 
religion is an important factor in analyzing the development of the human culture.  
 
7.3.5.4 Art 
The final of Cassirer’s symbolic forms is art. The artist creates his or hers product on 
a tradition and a set of rules, yet the essential thing about art, for it to be a 
masterpiece, is originality.  
 
“This form of originality is the prerogative and distinction of art; it cannot be 
extended to other fields of human activity… We may speak of Newton as a 
scientific genius; but in that case we speak only metaphorically… The relation 
between subjectivity and objectivity, individually and universality, is indeed not 
the same in the work of art as it is in the work of scientists.”107 
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The difference between art and science lies not in their methods of working but in the 
relation between initiator and result. 
The example of art is a good way to assemble these different categories of which 
Cassirer speaks. As a symbol, art consist of all the principals that make the other 
symbolic forms. Art builds on tradition as (mythological-) religion, it is an 
exploration of thoughts and new ideas as in science and it bares a communicative 
purpose as language. As all of the above art evolves constantly, this is its very 
essence. 
 
7.3.6 man’s self-liberation 
These different symbolic forms are signifiers in man’s pursuit of self-liberation, as 
Cassirer states in his conclusion. 
 
“Human culture taken as a whole may be described as the process of man’s 
progressive self-liberation. Language, art, religion, science are various phrases 
in this process. In all of them man discovers and proves a new power – the 
power to build up a world of his own, an ‘ideal’ world. Philosophy cannot give 
up its search for a fundamental unity in this ideal world.”108 
 
Through the usage of the mentioned symbolic forms man makes up his own world. 
Man creates theories of how things should be and is then proofed right or wrong. 
Without these symbols, without the productive imagination, man would be caught in 
a static situation from where he could never evolve or rise. Even though these 
different categories are not coherently working towards the same ‘goal’ so to speak, 
they do interact on a basic level. The crisis of which Cassirer speaks early on in the 
essay is not to be ignored he says. There are frictions and tensions in the different 
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thoughts, and ideals of man at the time being but history proves that the interrelation 
of these divisions is a sure sign of evolvement in human culture. If one wants to give 
an actual definition of Cassirer’s humanism the result would be this cultural 
evolvement and development. This is also implied as he himself speaks of the 
humanistic circle and the self-liberation, which this circle develops towards. 
 
7.3.7 Problems on Cassirer 
We have found one primary problem in Cassirer’s philosophy in An Essay on Man: 
Man has, unintentionally, created symbolic forms to understand his experiences of 
the world, what Cassirer does not answer is towards what this development 
progresses. 
 
7.3.7.1 The self-liberation problem 
According to Cassirer man uses symbols to free himself but he does not really give 
any explanation of what this self-liberation is aimed towards. It is up to ones own 
interpretation how to conceive this self liberation as Cassirer only mentions it at the 
end of the essay and never gets to a discussion and definition of it. 
 
“Human culture taken as a whole may be described as the process of man’s 
progressive self-liberation. Language, art, religion, science are various phrases in this 
process. In all of them man discovers and proves a new power – the power to build 
up a world of his own, an ‘ideal’ world. Philosophy cannot give up its search for a 
fundamental unity in this ideal world.”109 
 
The concept “self-liberation” is presented as being an essential part of Cassirer’s 
philosophy. That the concept is not explained leaves the reader in a questioning 
position; what does the concept imply?  
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One might be obliged to see this self-liberation as the undetermined goal of the circle 
of humanity. But one would have to conceive self-liberation as a progressive action; 
as it is a result of man creating symbols. These concepts actually imply that man is 
aware of creating the symbols, yet Cassirer stresses that it is only through the history 
of human culture that this progress is visible.  
 
7.3.7.2 Lack of ontological specification 
Making use of a concept such as self-liberation Cassirer indicates an ontological 
positioning, which he does not explicate: What does this self refer to? 
Though Cassirer thinks of self-liberation as the human cultural development through 
history, it is strange for him to neglect the more immediate connotation of the 
concept. It could also be interpreted as part of an ontological angle.  
To present a theory on man one should take a notion on man’s common conditions. 
Cassirer finishes his essay by vaguely sketching his view on this subject but he does 
not describe what he means when using this concept of self-liberation. It is critical 
that Cassirer opens such a discussion without any closure.  
Cassirer writes that philosophy has to consider the unity that bonds the different 
sciences and is a coherency in the anarchy of thought110; this implies that man as an 
individual needs to revise his view on the constructions language, religion, art and 
science. This reflection will have an ontological side to it through which man needs 
to contemplate on his existence in correlation to this new experience of living in a 
world of symbols.  
Cassirer’s lack of ontological depth is not just proven in his conclusion he also seems 
to have these reflections as a foundation for his theory, yet he does not elaborate on 
them. 
 
7.3.5.3 The ontological possibility 
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What might come as a surprise when having read the above, is that Cassirer’s 
ontological opening gives us the possibility to relate him to Sartre. On the basis that 
we will elaborate on in the deconstruction part, when discussing Sartre and Cassirer, 
a red line in humanism emerges. Because Cassirer is of the analytic philosophical 
tradition, it seems tough to make any particular relation between him and Sartre but it 
goes to show that the relation is of great importance. Cassirer’s ontological opening 
gives us the possibility of setting Sartre’s subjective-projecting philosophy into the 
common context as each of their characteristics of man’s role are quite similar. But 
had Cassirer not given his expression of an ontological consciousness, it would have 
been a somewhat far-fetched comparison to draw.    
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8. Deconstruction 
 
Our wondering on the subject of humanism is based on the many interpretations of 
the concept/term. To get a clearer view on some of these interpretations we analyzed 
the chosen philosopher’s works on the subject. To concretize the discussion we have 
finished each chapter with a critique of each of the three philosophers work. Taking 
our point of departure in the critique we will debate and compare the opinions of 
Heidegger, Cassirer and Sartre in the following chapter. The purpose is to end up 
with a few concrete points on which they agree and from these points we are going to 
draw our conclusion in the next chapter.  
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8.1.1 Sartre: Freedom in the situation 
We have said that Sartre defines freedom as freedom to choose our own essence in 
every situation rather than freedom from outer restraints111. The absolute freedom of 
the choice is inferred from the description of the (existential) cogito112 in which the 
consciousness becomes aware of itself as consciousness. We have also said that the 
consciousness’ sensation of itself renders our projection of ourselves beyond our 
present situation possible. And “project” is a negation of a given state of affair i.e. 
our present situation. We are not caught up in a certain development, which we 
cannot deviate from: 
 
 “An existentialist will never take man as the end, since man is still to be 
 determined”113 
 
In the light of this projection of ourselves we can say that the given states of affairs 
appear as incomplete to the consciousness. We can also explain the relationship 
between a given states of affair and the consciousness: the freedom of the 
consciousness is realised in the nihilation of the given. This is what we can call 
freedom in the situation. It is our projects, which determines how the world appears 
to us. 
 
8.1.2 The human nature and the human condition 
In the discussion following the lecture “Existentialism is a Humanism” the 
sociologist, Naville, points out that Sartre merely replaces the concept of a “human 
nature” with a concept of a “human condition”114 i.e. man as an abandoned and 
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condemned project. He admits that man cannot simply be defined by some abstract 
concept that applies to all humans. However he asserts that Sartre fails to understand 
the human nature, which he claims is defined by a multi-causality. This is a serious 
objection, which places Sartre in the very same tradition of metaphysics that he tries 
to part from. We can reconstruct Naville’s views with the following assertions115:  
 
• There exists such a thing as causality. 
• Man exists in the world, as any other object, in a causal network (e.g. a 
complex relationship of social, historical, psychological, biological 
circumstances, which varies over time), which determines his being in the 
world. 
• Today the human nature is determined by social structures, which are 
characterized by the dissolution of the classes, conflicts, the transition from 
one social system to another and the conjunction of different races and nations. 
• A human nature implies the existence of certain laws that determines his 
existence in the world.  
 
Naville’s assertions are critical as they define the human nature, as a historical and 
social construction, which implies the existence of objective laws for the human 
being. These laws are objective in the sense that they apply to all human beings and 
we can identify them with the socio-economical and culture-historical dimensions of 
realty. We should note that Naville places the human being both as a subject and an 
object of knowledge. The reduction of man to an object amongst other objects in the 
world implies that objective laws, rather than a devoted and authentic choice, 
determine the existence of man. Naville’s materialistic position116 therefore 
contradicts Sartre’s existentialistic notion of freedom i.e. the absolute freedom to 
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choose our own essence in every situation. Accordingly Sartre rejects all of Naville’s 
claims. Even the concept of causality is regarded to be just another projection of the 
consciousness’ effort to uncover meaning. Sartre’s rejection implies, however, that he 
cannot avoid Naville’s critique that existentialism fails to give a proper definition of 
the human circumstance. Sartre explains the human circumstance as being 
subjectively conceived by the individual, which means that it becomes arbitrary and 
individual. It is therefore impossible to determine an authentic existentialistic choice 
of project for the individual. The condition concerning authenticity and devotion is in 
no way decisive on what sort of life we should lead. 
 
8.1.3 Freedom and ethics  
As condemned to freedom we can choose to kill our neighbour or we can choose not 
to. The condition concerning authenticity and devotion does not yield any normative 
propositions, beside of the demand of authenticity and devotion itself. The choice 
therefore becomes contingent. But can the condition concerning authenticity and 
devotion be a foundation for an ethics? 
 The subjectivity which existentialism seeks to defend is the understanding of mans 
absolute freedom. The absolute freedom implies an absolute responsibility, as no 
outer or inner factors can be decisive in our choice of project. However the second 
understanding of subjectivism depicts man as confined to isolation. As we have 
mentioned this is the one notion that Sartre seeks to avoid. Accordingly he claims that 
man is not only responsible for himself but he is also responsible for all humans117:  
 
1) Man always chooses what is of value to him – man can never choose the worse 
over the better. 
2) To choose something is to confirm its value. 
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3) When we choose a project we are the same time choosing a type of man i.e. 
how we think a man should be. 
4) Individual responsibility implies a universal responsibility. 
 
However the argument seems to involve an error. Even if we grant “1), 2) and 3)” we 
cannot derive “4)” from “3)” i.e. Sartre derives his conclusion on an assumption that 
in choosing something we are at the same time acknowledging its universal value. 
There are two ways of understanding the argument: 
 
a) Individual responsibility implies universal responsibility in the sense that 
our individual project expresses a type of man, which we think should 
apply to all men (regardless of other agents opinions). 
 
b) Individual responsibility implies universal responsibility in the sense that 
we are obligated to choose a project that expresses a type of man, which 
can be accepted by other agents. 
 
The argument is valid if we understand it in the sense of “a)”. However the individual 
agent becomes the only legislator of what is right and wrong actions. An SS officer 
can from this perspective morally justify the genocide of 10 million Jews. Killing 
Jews is a morally right action to an SS officer as long as he is committed and 
devoted. In other words “a)” confines Sartre’s agent to subjectivity and thus we are 
faced with the initial problems, which we started out with. 
If we understand the argument in the sense of “b)” we can break the isolation of 
subjectivity i.e. we should only choose projects which can be accepted by other 
agents. This means that the individual agent’s opinion of what is a good project is not 
the sole legislator of what a good project is. Rather we should consider what other 
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agents think. However “b)” is an invalid argument. We can describe the traditional 
definition of the structure of a valid argument with the following:  
 
 An argument is valid if and only if an assertion of the truth of the premises and 
 a denial of the conclusion is a self-contradiction.  
 
We can define the structure of an invalid argument with the following: 
 
 An argument is invalid if and only if an assertion of the truth of the premises 
 and a denial of the conclusion is not a self-contradiction. 
 
These definitions are supported by Graham Forbes118. If we grant the truth of “1), 2) 
and 3)” then we will not contradict ourselves if we reject the conclusion “that we are 
obligated to choose a project or action that expresses a type of man, which can be 
accepted by other people.” There is no self-contradiction involved for a person, on 
one hand, to claim that she/he is the sole legislator of what are right and wrong 
projects for all men. And on the other hand to reject that a chosen project has to be 
verified by other people. This is a perfectly consistent view. However we can derive 
the conclusion that we should choose a project that expresses how we think a man 
should be. But “b)” conflicts with Sartre’s main doctrine, i.e. that we cannot rely on 
any outer factors in our choices. 
    Sartre however tells us that:  
 
”So every man ought to say, ”Am I really a man who has the right to act 
in such a manner that humanity regulates itself by what I do.””119 
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 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Existentialism is a Humanism, p. 352 
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This indicates that we should understand the argument for universal responsibility in 
the sense of “a)”. But Sartre’s normative proposition does not yield a foundation for a 
moral philosophy. Rather this is a philosophy of prudence, which has nothing to with 
a universal responsibility. We can finally say that Sartre notion of absolute freedom 
fails to save man from absolute subjectivism. The absolute freedom to choose our 
own essence in every situation implies that existentialism cannot yield a foundation 
for an ethics, which can tell us how to lead our lives. The existentialistic choice 
seems to appear as arbitrary rather than an attempt to realize a devoted project. 
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8.2 Heidegger vs. Sartre 
 
8.2.1 Humanism and the technical interpretation 
Although Heidegger argues against humanism - asserting that all humanisms are 
build upon metaphysics or creates a foundation for metaphysics – he still seeks to 
uncover (point out) the essence of man, which is the humanitas in homo. Heidegger 
creates an antihumanism, however not in the sense that he seeks to create a theory 
that is not concerned with man, rather it is an attempt to create a theory that is not 
concerned with the traditional definitions made by metaphysics. Heidegger defines 
man by Ek-sistence, which is a definition that exceeds the traditional concepts of 
metaphysics: “potentia as the essentia of actus of existential.”120                                                                                                                             
 
”Only as so long as Dasein is, is there (gibt es) Being” (...) But the 
sentence does not mean that the Dasein of man in the traditional sense of 
existentia, and thought in modern philosophy as the actuality of the ego 
cogito, is that being through which Being is first fashioned.”121 
 
Here Heidegger points out how he differs from most philosophy, which according to 
Heidegger, has traditionally been concerned with the relationship between the subject 
and the object.122 However Heidegger explains that the being, in this sense, is 
something, which is constituted by a subject through a technical interpretation of 
thinking. The purpose of thinking becomes a practical one i.e. action as the purpose 
of thinking. We can explain Heidegger’s ontological distinction between “the being” 
and “Being” (in the above) as a distinction between the “technical interpretation of 
thinking” and “Being as the element of thinking”. 
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8.2.2 Antihumanism vs. existentialism 
Heidegger’s concept on “ek-sistens” differs from “existentia” the reality, which is 
constituted by the subject of the ego cogito.123 Heidegger is indeed concerned with 
the truth of being. However the truth of being can only present itself by the help of 
the human being hence man is the “neighbour” or the “shepherd” of being.  
     Sartre, on the other hand, describes his subject (“an abandoned and condemned 
project”) as an absolute foundation for meaning and knowledge. However, Sartre 
places himself together with Heidegger in a line of philosophy he calls the existential 
atheists “what they have in common is simply the fact that they believe that existence 
comes before essence.”124 As mentioned in an earlier chapter Sartre seeks to part 
from the traditional definitions of man. In Letter on Humanism Heidegger replies 
that: 
 
”Sartre expresses the basic tenet of existentialism in this way: Existence 
precedes essence. In this statement he is taking existentia and essentia 
according to their metaphysical meaning, which from Plato’s time on has said 
that essentia precedes existentia. Sartre reverses this statement. But a reversal 
of a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysical statement.”125  
 
He argues that Sartre fails to come up with a radical new way of conceiving man and 
thus remains inside the traditional line of metaphysics although he tries to part from 
it. Sartre rejects the traditional metaphysical concepts of God and all a priori 
definitions of the human being and thus reverses the traditional conception that 
essence precedes existence. We mentioned in an earlier chapter how this reversal was 
established:  
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1) God does not exist. 
2) The consciousness, as an act of nihilation of the given, projects meaning to the 
world.  
3) Existence comes before essence.  
  
Sartre’s assertion, that existence precedes essence, depends on his definition of the 
relationship between the two fundamental categories: being-in-itself and Being-for-
itself, which implies the traditional metaphysical conception that the subject 
constitutes the meaning of the object.  
Heidegger’s conversion of Sartre’s claim “we are now upon the plane where there are 
only men.”126 to “We are precisely in a situation where principally there is Being”127  
marks a basic difference between the two philosophers: Sartre is concerned with the 
being (being-in-itself) from the perspective of the being of man: 
  
 ”At the point of departure there cannot be any other truth than this, I think, 
 therefore I am, which is the absolute trut hof consiciouness as it atains to 
 itself128”  
 
Whereas Heidegger is concerned with Being. 
The subject which Sartre assigns an absolute freedom is in Heidegger’s terms not free 
i.e. Heidegger has identified the conception of the subject, as constitutional of the 
being, with an instrumental use of thinking and thinking thus abandons its element. 
Thinking becomes technical in the sense that it is concerned with the first causes i.e. 
first philosophy or metaphysics.  Thus Sartre confines his subject to a technical and 
manipulating view on the being. We can say that Sartre fails to acknowledge that 
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”Every humanism is either grounded in a metaphysics or is in itself made to be the 
ground of one.”129 
                                                 
129
 Ibid. p. 202 
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8.3 Sartre & Cassirer 
 
8.3.1 The interrelation 
The idea is to find a common denominator in the philosophers’ concept of humanism. 
Taking Sartre and Cassirer into consideration one needs to view their differences 
before comparing them. Though they do not stem from the same tradition they are 
actually fairly compatible and even though it seems self-contradictory to say so 
because their beliefs naturally disagree, let’s keep in mind that it is not important 
whether they generally disagree on the role of philosophy but on the discussion of 
humanism. Sartre’s philosophy is of an existential-phenomenological tradition 
whereas Cassirer deals with a cultural philosophy. 130 Even though they come from 
different traditions they still have a common view on man, and that it is of high 
importance for our discussion to describe how they characterize man’s role.  
When reading Sartre and Cassirer an important inter-relation emerged to us. They put 
man in the same position and give him the same characteristics yet there seem to be 
no actual connection between their arguments. Of course we do not want to create 
coherence if it does not exist, but as we are taking our point of departure in 
humanism, the notion that man’s role is given in both of their philosophies is of great 
importance.   
Cassirer gives man a creator-role i.e. a creator of a world of symbols.  
 
 “Human culture taken as a whole may be described as the process of man’s 
 progressive self-liberation. Language, art, religion, science are various phrases 
 in this process. In all of them man discovers and proves a new power, the 
                                                 
130
 The term cultural philosophy has since been established as an actual branch of philosophy which was not constituted 
in the same way at that time as it is today.   
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 power to build up a world of his own, an ‘ideal’ world. Philosophy cannot give 
 up its search for a fundamental unity in this ideal world.”131 
 
This self-liberation and ideal world is a creation of man through history whereas 
Sartre’s perspective is from an angle of ontological-individuality, man is described in 
his own relation to his subjective self. 
 
 “(…) existence comes before essence (…)”132 
 
Man decides for himself what he will make of his existence. The moral-existential 
choice is what is up for debate in this quote. The big difference between Sartre’s 
argumentation and that of Cassirer’s, is that man chooses for himself in relation to 
other people. Cassirer talks about the historical development of man; Sartre is talking 
about choice on the existential moral issue of man as individual.  
 
 “Man makes himself; he is not ready-made; he makes himself by the choice of 
 his morality, and he cannot, but choose a morality, such is the pressure of 
 circumstances around him.”133 
 
Morality is an ethical issue, which Cassirer does not write his meaning about. He 
writes about the development of the term ethics through history but only to reach the 
conclusion that ethics are developed along with religion. A symbol in the symbol-
system, one might say. 
Sartre, on the other hand, does not mention history at all as an influence on the 
existential choice of man.  
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8.3.2 On common ground 
What we are heading at is a comparison between each of their characterization of 
man’s role, his role in respectively the symbolic or subjective reality. 134 
The determination of both worlds is the same, because they are both man’s creation. 
But both philosophers are of the conviction that these worlds are created by man to 
hold meaning/essence, which is not present in the physical/objective reality. 
 
We now have a common feature in humanism: man creates alternatives to the 
physical/objective reality. Humanism is described as a constellation/matrix135 created 
to interpret and project meaning to the existence of man: both individually and co-
existing. 
The idea of our project is to discover and describe the common denominator(s) of 
humanism and to come up with a common signification of the word on the 
background of these three philosophers’ work on the subject. Therefore, to wind up 
with this kind of ‘definition’ is of course great, yet not in any way surprising. 
Reading any encyclopaedia or lexica one will find very different descriptions of the 
term humanism but many of these do agree on this particular point. These different 
descriptions are touching upon exactly the same view as Sartre and Cassirer express. 
These encyclopaedia descriptions are of course not identical but when reading them 
more thoroughly this description is quite general.  
What we are able to constitute now in the description of humanism is the 
characterization of man’s role. Man is the creator of an alternative ideal world. In this 
world man is the single creator of meaning and essence –according to Sartre and 
Cassirer.  
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8.3.3 The matrix of humanism 
What is humanism then if it has nothing to do with the ‘real world’?  
Going into a description of Sartre’s and Cassirer’s humanism with man as creator, 
one is not able to constitute the rules of how man should lead his life.  
Their humanism constitutes the framework or in a scientific language, a matrix of 
humanism in which man creates whatever meaning he pleases, therefore humanism is 
somewhat unavoidable. Humanism to them is a constellation rather than the content.  
To explain why the word matrix is such a good term to explicate their view we have 
looked in the web-dictionary Wiktionary. This dictionary is quoted below: 
Matrix described as in terms of biology: 136  
“Material or tissue in which more specialized structures are embedded” 
A synonym of matrix is ‘vector’, which is explained in the terms of mathematics as: 
137
 
“A vector of one's liking, fitting with cultural ideals.” 
It might seem a little audacious to compilate these two scientific versions of the 
synonyms matrix and vector, but it makes perfect sence when trying to explain 
Sartre’s and Cassirer’s humanism: 
‘The matrix of humanism is the tissue in which more specialized structures of one’s 
liking/fitting with cultural ideas are embedded.’ 
The specialized structures are Cassirer’s symbols and Sartre’s projection of meaning. 
Following Sartre and Cassirer in each of their descriptions, this definition actually 
assembles what they say. 
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8.4 Cassirer & Heidegger 
 
Cassirer and Heidegger were two very different philosophers. One needs to go into 
the depth with Heidegger in order to understand his view on man and not to mention, 
Heidegger’s terms and concepts, whereas Cassirer writes about the determination of 
man in a way that one can understand in a sense that do not need any further 
“research”.  
On the basis of the reconstruction part that determines each of their different 
definitions on man, a comparison leading to a debate between Heidegger and Cassirer 
can be made. 
 
Metaphysics is a highly discussed not to mention criticized subject in Heidegger’s 
Letter on Humanism.138 Heidegger does not believe that metaphysics should be used 
in the determination of man, because he does not think that metaphysics is capable of 
setting man high enough to do that. But Cassirer would not entirely leave out the 
metaphysical aspect. He stresses that metaphysics in combination with other aspects, 
i.e. the symbols, can define man.  
It is the combination of the physical and metaphysical aspects together with the circle 
of humanity a definition of man is possible. Heidegger would not think that this claim 
is enough to hold good because of his profound interpretation of man in relation to 
Being.139 According to Cassirer using the symbols from his circle of humanity man 
understands himself as the human being he is. Heidegger would far from agree to 
this. He would stress that it is the way man chooses to use these symbols – his 
intention for using them – that is relevant. Furthermore he would claim that the 
chosen symbols are far from enough in defining man i.e. it would be seen as shallow 
to use the circle of humanity, because then it would define man by starting from the 
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outside working ones way in. Heidegger would do it differently i.e. take his point of 
departure in a phenomenological140 description of man.  
Heidegger often suggested new options on ways of thinking, but he never claimed 
that he was wrong in his prior statements and interpretations.141  The most important 
issue in Heidegger’s philosophy is the question about Being142. This is an important 
issue that separates Heidegger’s philosophy from that of Cassirer. Cassirer believes 
that the symbols which consist of religion, language, history and art are what is 
necessary for humans to use in the interpretation of themselves and this is the main 
issue in Cassirer’s philosophy. He furthermore concludes that on the basis of these 
symbols man must be defined as an animal symbolicum.143  
From each of their different starting points Heidegger and Cassirer try to define man. 
Against the background of Cassirer’s animal symbolicum a difference in the two 
philosophers shows. Cassirer see man as an animal but an animal with qualities that 
makes man capable of doing things like to be alert of his surroundings and 
furthermore creating the mentioned symbols. Heidegger distinguishes between 
animals and humans by saying: 
 
“Because plants and animals are lodged in their respective environments but are 
never placed freely in the lighting of Being which alone is “world”, they lack 
language. But in being denied language they are not thereby suspended 
wordlessly in their environment. Still, in this word “environment” converges all 
that is puzzling about living creatures.”144 
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By this Heidegger stresses that even though animals are without language they are 
still a part of this world like humans but they are, unlike humans, standing in the 
lighting of Being. This means that man has the capability of choosing animals do not: 
e.g. standing in the lighting of Being. By this Heidegger denies animals having the 
same capability of interpreting Being the way humans can. This way Heidegger 
distinguishes between animals and humans though they are both defined in the same 
category as living creatures. But here Cassirer would argue that humans are only 
animals creating the world they want to live in and this they are doing with the use of 
the symbols.145 If it were not for the symbols man would be nothing more but an 
animal.   
 
8.4.1 Language 
Another relevant issue in the discussion of Heidegger and Cassirer is the comparison 
of the individual philosopher’s way of dealing with language and that is how they use 
different interpretations of language to discuss their determination of what man is. 
Cassirer says that to be able to understand our role in the world and to see how we 
should interpret meaning, we must understand language146. Cassirer and Heidegger 
have to some extent a common point of view when it comes to the importance of 
language in the definition of man. Cassirer bases his argument, concerning man as an 
animal producing symbols, on the fact that language is built up of symbols. Cassirer 
argues that what is essential about man is the way he is creating meaning with 
language, whereas Heidegger conceives it to be that man interprets Being in 
language.147  
This difference reflects, that according to Cassirer man’s project is to reach a higher 
and higher acknowledgement about beings/entities, whereas according to Heidegger 
this project is fruitless. According to Cassirer our project is to speak of what is and 
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according to Heidegger our project is to speak of what is not (yet). Language can 
never “be thought of in an essentially correct way in terms of its symbolic character, 
perhaps not even in terms of the character of signification. Language is the lighting-
concealing advent of Being itself. ”148 But in a way they are searching for the same 
because in stead of searching for the source of all man’s cultural expressions as 
Heidegger does, Cassirer searches for the common denominator and finds: the 
symbol. And language originates from the use of symbols. In a way Cassirer’s symbol 
and Heidegger’s Being are both the place/dimension/source, wherefrom the new 
comes. But the only thing Cassirer says about the relation between symbol and man is 
that man creates the symbol. Man is the creator of all the new and God could just as 
well be in man’s place as the creator and this certainly corresponds to Protagora’s 
sentence.149 That does however not say anything about man other than he is creating. 
Cassirer leaves man as a black box150 but that, however, is not a problem in Cassirer’s 
humanism. Man’s project, that we somehow are trying to find out what is within this 
black box of man through our use of symbols in language, art, myth, religion and 
science, is what Cassirer conceives to be the humanistic project, i.e. humanism.  
Heidegger has two main objections to this:  
1. In such a project man conceives himself to be the lord of beings, all the entities to 
be there for the purpose of his project. In this project man would not be open to what 
he is in that his thinking would be in service for the project and therefore not be in its 
element, where it is open to interpreting Being, i.e. interpreting what man is.  
2. Man is not a black box. What man is lies in the destiny of Being, and Being is 
forever changing.  
Heidegger’s idea of creating a new humanism has its starting point in language, in the 
saying of language. When thinking is in its element, i.e. Being, language says. And it 
is through this saying man interprets what he is. Cassirer’s analytical treatment of 
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language does not take the same specific and very radical turns towards an 
explanation of why language is the door to an understanding of man in the same way 
as Heidegger does.  
To understand the message Cassirer wants to share with his reader concerning the 
importance of language in a philosophical context, one must keep in mind that he 
chooses to show and express his idea of language in a historical presentation. Still, he 
does formulate his own meaning but mostly based on statements of others.  
By this comparison it shows that the two philosophers, Heidegger and Cassirer, are 
somewhat different in their ways of interpreting man as a human being. In reading the 
above one also see that Heidegger do not use the word “animal” the way Cassirer 
does. In Letter on Humanism it is Being that is the main issue in interpreting man and 
in Cassirer’s An Essay on Man man’s understanding of himself is based on Animal 
symbolicum.   
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8.5 Summing up 
Sartre describes man’s constant projecting and pursuit of transcendent aims that make 
us able to exist and live an authentic life. This relation of transcendence as 
constitutive of man with subjectivity is what Sartre calls existential humanism. 
Existentialism says that there is no legislator but man himself. Sartre’s philosophy is 
a description of the consciousness and its relation to the things and other people.  
His philosophy is an attempt to uncover the human being solely from the perspective 
of the human subjectivity.  
Cassirer takes a position that is quite similar yet on another level of philosophy, so to 
speak. Because Cassirer stems from an analytic tradition he is not much of going into 
man’s self, but relies on a wider perspective of analysing all of mankind in a historic 
context. For Cassirer the symbol is the absolute main issue for interpreting the human 
acknowledgement. He argues that religion, language, history and art are the symbolic 
forms we use to get an understanding of ourselves. We have reached so far beyond 
any other animal’s capability of thinking that we need the symbolic system. He 
explains how we are entangled in a web that consists only of symbols. Living in 
symbols, humans must think in symbols and therefore take starting point in a 
definition of man as a symbolic animal. Because of this, man must also be defined as 
an animal symbolicum. The different symbolic forms are signifiers in man’s pursuit 
of self-liberation and through the usage of the mentioned symbolic forms man makes 
up his own world. There are frictions and tensions in the different thoughts and ideals 
of man at the time being, but history proves that the interrelation of these divisions is 
a sure sign of development in human culture. If one wants to give an actual definition 
of Cassirer’s humanism the result would look something like this self-liberation 
through cultural development.      
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Heidegger 
Humanism consist of what lies in man’s essence but ek-sistence is the key to man as 
Being, and thereby the key to Heidegger’s humanism. Heidegger opposes to the 
metaphysical humanisms because they are not able to ask about the truth of Being. He 
does not reject other interpretations of man, but it is a question of realizing the proper 
humanitas. Heidegger does not believe that man’s present view upon himself is set 
high enough, and therefore it excludes him from guarding the truth of Being. Man 
needs to liberate himself from disturbing material elements to be able to recognize the 
truth of Being. At the same time Heidegger proposes that humanism should be given 
a new meaning which is man as the shepherd of Being, guarding the truth of Being. 
Heidegger believes in a pure ontology that bares no need of interpretation, just pure 
recognition, no medias are needed to make understanding. 
 
Sartre describes man as a creator of essence in his own existence by projecting a 
subjective reality. 
Cassirer describes man through the history of mankind as creator of symbols through 
which we relate to all aspects of human life. He does not as Sartre and Heidegger 
treat the subject of man’s relation to his individuality. 
Heidegger parts from both Cassirer and Sartre because he describes metaphysics 
(symbols and subjective reality) as mans alienation from the recognition of the truth 
of Being. 
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9. Construction 
 
Taking our point of departure in the re- and deconstruction we have reached a point 
where we are able to make a construction. On the basis of the many interpretations 
and conclusions in the first chapters, it is possible to see many different angels from 
which humanism can be criticized. In the following we will treat three different 
notions of critique, which have been interesting in the search for a common 
denominator for humanism. First we present a discourse based on two different and 
opponent philosophical standpoints. One defending the ontological perspective and 
the other defends the metaphysical. The last part is concerned with how and why 
humanism is relevant today.  
 
9.1 Polarized argumentations 
During the deconstruction we have come to choose two sides. Or rather come to 
sympathize with on one hand Cassirer and Sartre in one camp, and Heidegger in the 
other. These sympathies we will explicate through one spokesman for each position 
taken in the humanism discussion. It also has the purpose to find out how far we can 
come with philosophy in such a discussion and a springboard to the final reflection 
upon humanism.  
 
9.1.1 The ontologist 
I have found that Sartre and Cassirer are both of the conviction that man’s relation to 
the world i.e. all beings/entities can only be a reality established by man where 
thinking is man’s tool for relating the world to him. But I claim that we cannot be 
sure of this to be the purpose of thinking.  
There is a lack of explanation in Sartre and Cassirer when it comes to the following 
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example: “the rose blossoming without a “why?””151 Looking at the rose through the 
eyes of Sartre and Cassirer it makes no sense for the rose to blossom. For Sartre the 
rose is in-itself and as such meaningless. And for Cassirer the rose becomes a symbol 
to us. Neither of their philosophies mirror any reflection upon, why the world is as it 
is, i.e. why this rose is blossoming. They choose to relate themselves ignorant to this. 
To Heidegger the “being of the world” is the big question. He does not answer it but 
takes it as a point of departure. As he writes about Parmenides’152 sentence “for there 
is Being” (esti gar einai): “The primal mystery for all thinking is concealed in this 
phrase.”153 The being of the rose, the being of the sky, the being of the universe all 
have the same question in common: what is this Being? And in the midst of all this 
being is man. But he is not in the same way as the rose. He asks: why? He can ask: 
Why? The rose is just blossoming without a why, does not ask: why? But man is, and 
is only in constant relating to Being, to the “big mystery” of why the world is as it is, 
i.e. he in his possession of language is placed ek-sistingly in the lighting of Being. 
Therefore Being is important and not man. Man’s relation to the world is inherent to 
Being, the very same mystery of “the rose”. His relation to the world according to 
Heidegger is thereby not conflicting when it comes to “the rose”, as in Sartre and 
Cassirer’s philosophies. Sartre writes that we must choose our essence, and choose 
our essence from acting in a world without meaning. This is like walking into a 
supermarket and filling up a shopping trolley. It does not say anything about the 
products and the supermarket as a whole. How come that is a projection of meaning? 
Where does this meaning stem from?  
Cassirer claims us to be building up a world of symbols and through this liberate us 
from the symbols. We are trying to tell ourselves something through our use of 
symbols. This project is just like the Babel tower over again. The bricks constituting 
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the tower are entities with different layers of symbolic meaning. The tower is build 
higher and higher, i.e. more and more symbols are created. The only difference is that 
God is replaced with man. The explanation of man’s relation to the world is to be 
solved from within man. And as I said before, this view does not overcome the 
problem of “the rose”.  
Truth of Being is certainly not something alien to me. It happens in everyday life. 
Sometimes I slip out of the “usual treatment of the entities”. I would describe it as 
somewhat surrealistic. E.g. I have tried sitting in a train thinking of nothing when a 
sudden awareness occurs. The train becomes a crazy construction; it could just as 
well be a spaceship. This is because the train is not enclosed in its usual connection of 
meaning. It is about the same experience as the contemplating point when reading a 
poem where it feels like time stands still. Although can hardly be described, we know 
something is happening to us. This sort of thinking is in its element.  
 
9.1.2 The metaphysician 
I claim that man does not exist as man if he is not defining and interpreting himself in 
relation to the being of entities. Entities are here defined as the being of everything 
from being of the beer-jug bottom to the being of a God. I believe that metaphysics 
are unavoidable and the only useful essence in human life. I do not find that man 
obstructs himself in reaching the lighting of being when subjecting him to 
metaphysics. I believe that man is not able to exist if he does not define himself in 
relation to all entities. I believe that man’s consciousness is a construction of 
symbols154 that constitutes everything from which man understands his own 
existence. Humanism is an empty shell in which man creates whatever context 
needed for his understanding. 
 
1st claim 
                                                 
154
 Referring to Cassirer 
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Man is not able to comprehend his own existence if he is not defining and 
interpreting himself in relation to the being of all other entities.  
Man separates himself from all other existences. This separation is the only 
possibility for man to acknowledge his own existence as man will never be able to 
search the reins and hearts of himself with any other result than discovering the lack 
of essence in his existence. 155  
 
2nd claim     
Metaphysics are the only useful instrument that man has to acknowledge his own 
existence. There is no such thing as “das Ding an sich”,156 all entities exist only in 
relation to their context. For man to create or discover any essence or meaning he 
needs to acknowledge the broad context of the being of entities. This broad context is 
in the end an extreme mixture of interrelation that exists by the virtue of itself. This 
argument is not to be seen as a Münchhausen-trilemma157 falsity because the essences 
of all entities only exist in man’s search of context. When treating Heidegger this 
context becomes visualized and projected in the example of man searching for the 
lightning of being, the original truth a context in which man embarks. Metaphysics is 
man’s way of creating a meaning in a context which is not ‘real’, evidently there is no 
such existence as a meaning besides what is put in context by man. 
3rd claim   
Humanism is a shell of context in which man subjects meaning and essence that he is 
not able to relate to a more refined or definite category. When man valuates 
something he constitutes a meaning and the valuation is yet another context and 
                                                 
155
 Referring to Sartre 
156
 English: The thing in itself. -see reconstruction on Heidegger. 
157
 Jacob Friedrich Fries (1773 -1843) Münchausen-trilemma:  
 1. Vi ender i en uendelig regres, dvs. begrundelsen bliver aldrig færdig. 
 2. Vi får et cirkelbevis, hvormed vi antager det, vi skulle bevise. 
 3. Vi ender med dogmatisk at antage en påstand for sand uden at  
    begrunde den. 
     Kronik af Steen Nepper Larsen i Information, d.22.marts 1996 
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meaning creation. Heidegger’s valuation of metaphysics as not useful is accordingly 
an incorrectness in his own philosophy. Meaning is a metaphysical entity and when 
searching for truth of being a context is created. Truth of being is just as metaphysical 
as any conception of God. 
 
9.2 Relevance today? 
These positions could be applied when looking on humanism with a critical view on 
society in mind. This leads to the question: Are they relevant to our everyday life? 
 
The growing complexity of modern society and the constantly changing demands to 
its citizens has made a lot of people search for alternative lifestyles? 
The more complicated ordinary life gets, the more people seem to long for a return to 
simple life. In this context Heidegger’s question of Being appear even more relevant 
today than it possibly did when he wrote it. There are many parallels between the 
feeling of growing alienation towards the ever more technological modern society 
and e.g. Heidegger’s claim of man continually getting further and further from Being 
the more we “instrumentalize” the world. 
Heidegger did probably not intend for this direct interpretation of Being, but our 
modern day view upon ontology as just another thing to choose from among 
thousands of things presented to us everyday. From commercials for new products on 
tv to deciding upon changing job, makes us interpret and think upon it in a 
completely different context than the original. 
 
9.3 Humanism today? 
In this final part of our project we will take departure in our headline “humanism 
today?” Taking a departure in the headline one can make a clarification of the critical 
condition under which humanism in contemporary society has been assigned to. 
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Heidegger’s critique is focused on ontology i.e. how we have chosen to interpret 
ourselves as humans in relation to the entities.  
One can elaborate on contemporary humanism by using Heidegger’s terms to 
criticize the capitalistic modern society. Because, Heidegger suggests that we should 
be more attentive in our interfering with the world surrounding us. 
A common agreement concerning our way of living could emphasize that the 
mentality of the public to some extent has become materialistic.  
There are tendencies, which characterize modern society. Tendencies like an ever-
increasing focus on the individual i.e. there is a strong interest for every human being 
in society to emphasize originality.  
All of the actions man carry out in modern society can be defined as the qualities that 
describe him as a human being. This could very likely be labelled “humanism” - that 
is if one takes for granted that the frame in which humanistic values can be placed, 
contains human activity exclusively.  
In this perspective a lot of philosophical questions can be posed e.g. is man actually 
aware of his value, does he understand the privilege which has been given to him in 
that he is a creature who is able to reflect upon his own existence and capabilities?  
An argumentation line built upon the notion that Heidegger perceives man to be in 
such an intellectual position to go beyond the technical interpretations of entities and 
phenomena.  
The capitalistic society turns man into a consumer rather than a citizen. As consumers 
man must navigate in a world which offers him multiple supplements to our modern 
life e.g. entertainment and stimuli in terms of TV, pop music, clothes etc. The 
multiple offers support the image of “the perfect modern life”. The consumer society 
has no interest in maintaining a phenomological approach to the entities. The 
approach is materialistic and technical.   
Statistical facts concerning sociological aspects which appear in recent time 
contributes an understanding of how the general public’s (activities) has taken a 
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drastic turn. Rates on e.g. suicide, public depressions and demands for professional 
counselling have never previously been higher. Thus, one could conclude that there 
must be some consequences of the materialistic way of living. Seeing this, we get a 
picture of a society which, said in a very condemning manner, has lost the feeling 
with the true value of life and as Heidegger would put it, the truth of Being.  
 
Man creates a distance to the truth of Being when he lives his life materialistic. He 
does not relate to the thing-in-itself. The distance is emphasized in creation of 
concepts.    
Whether or not man has come to a turning point in the matter of identifying himself 
through the materialistic items of which he is surrounded, we can say nothing. 
Heidegger would of course through his formulated philosophical viewpoint 
underlining the importance of self-awareness i.e. not to be lost in a meaningless 
dealing with entities. 
 
Contemporary Society today does not give an answer or a common denominator for 
humanism. The modern man is left without a common shared basis for his own 
ontology. One can certainly use the philosophy of Heidegger to make a critique on 
contemporary society. Is the capitalistic society of the western world able to show 
openness towards Being or is Heidegger’s ideal society a utopia? An ideal utopia 
which maintain the natural human needs but also appreciates the fact that man also 
needs ’time and offers’ which can create space for the truth of Being. The 
appreciation of Being could manifest itself in a society which would be based on 
aesthetic values. It would have a greater focus on architecture and art. There could 
also be a greater focus on man’s relation to nature; a relationship where man would 
be able to reflect upon and be open to the lightning of being in peaceful and non-
technical surroundings.  
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The philosophy of Cassirer and Sartre can become basis for a contemporary critique 
as well. But the central issue of all the three philosophers’ theories must be their 
contribution to the concept of humanism. The traces they have left in the history of 
philosophy and the tools they have construed to us as a group and individuals.   
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10. Conclusion 
 
Through reading the three philosopher’s works and the analysis of these we have 
reached the conclusion that humanism is not a coherent term. We have shown a 
number of relations in between the philosophers but the only common denominator 
that actually shows is the description of man as ‘homo mensura’, man is the measurer 
of all things interpreted in the broadest sense possible. But the three would probably 
not on the other hand agree on a common interpretation of what this measurement 
should consist.  
We have described the tensions and frictions of the three philosophers. To Sartre the 
tension consists in the wish of keeping the individual responsibility of ones own life 
and on the basis of absolute freedom he tries to formulate a universal condition that 
could lead to an inter-subjective understanding. 
Cassirer opens a discussion in which man is placed as the epic of human history and 
to analyse this situation man needs to combine and understand the ‘circle of 
humanity’, the reality of symbols. What he does not elaborate on is how man should 
deal with him being in this symbol-reality individually. 
Cassirer and Sartre more or less agree upon the characteristic of man’s role as being 
the creator of meaning in accordingly his subjective-/symbol reality. 
Heidegger polarizes his philosophy to theirs. He is of the conviction that man should 
recognize the ontological difference and his philosophy is based on a quite strict 
ontological perception of how to conceive reality. Heidegger asserts that Sartre fails 
to part from what Heidegger labels as traditional philosophy. And thus Sartre’s 
existentialism maintains a technical and manipulating interpretation of the world 
rather than assigning man an absolute freedom. Heidegger also criticizes Cassirer’s 
philosophy of not having any relevance, because it lacks ontological perspective.  
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To concretise this polarization in their view of humanism we have in general 
formulated the attitudes of the different convictions from an ontological perspective, 
a metaphysical perspective.  
We have tried to answer our cardinal question “Are we able to determine a 
foundation for humanism?” through a construction of a foundation for a humanism 
on the background of our analysis. 
The answer to the cardinal question is that there is a basic foundation for the concept 
humanism, but there is no definite definition of it. In the word humanism many 
different but foremost positive issues lie. A common understanding of the word is 
composed by many positive values and being humane and not inhumane seems to be 
the deeper meaning of the word in general. The three philosophers, however, all 
defend each of their way of interpreting the concept of how man conceives reality. By 
doing this each of the three sets different foundations for humanism An answer to 
whom of the three philosophers is right is up to the individual reader to decide but the 
question on humanism remains open. 
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11. Dimension 
 
One of the main concepts of the Humanistic International Basic studies is an 
interdisciplinary approach to the educational method. Instead of the traditional 
position of most educational institutions RUC believes that by combining several 
disciplines into dimensions, students will get a better picture of the connections 
between the various disciplines. The idea is also to allow the students to let the 
problem decide which theories and methods from the diverse disciplines are to be 
used, and show the similarities and differences between them. 
 
In the course of our education on RUC we have to cover four dimensions, which are 
described as the four humanistic dimensions: Subjectivity & Learning, History & 
Culture, Text & Sign and Science & Philosophy. In our project we cover the 
philosophical dimension, by applying a hermeneutical approach i.e. we discuss and 
expand on several possible ways of interpreting the texts of the three philosophers.  
In our cardinal question the philosophical term “humanism” is our main focus. 
Through out the text we gain knowledge of philosophical and theoretical terms e.g. in 
our reflections on Heidegger’s ontology. E.g. epistemological approaches have been 
relevant for our interpretation and understanding of the projects coherency.  
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12. Process Description 
 
The process itself can be divided into three main periods. 
The first period had a duration of a month where we tried to make a structure for the 
project and figured out how to make group work. We worked out reading plans and 
read the three books, which were the primary literature. We also discussed the area of 
focus and tried to agree on a problem formulation. 
The second period was the period the week before the midterm evaluation and the 
two following weeks we produced the first written material including reconstruction 
parts of the three primary works and brainstorming for the problem formulation. 
After the midterm evaluation we spent a lot of time rewriting the papers we had done 
for the midterm evaluation and worked on a problem formulation we could stick to. 
The third period is the last month where we wrote the project itself. 
As mentioned we have had many discussions touching on various different areas, and 
many re-evaluations as to the direction the project have been going in. One of our 
reoccurring discussions has been whether the title of our project was appropriate and 
what the term “today” actually covers. One way to look upon “today” could be in the 
context of the long history of humanism, and in this perspective “today” could easily 
be said to cover the full length of the last century. Another way to think upon “today” 
would be the probably more common notion of meaning something more 
contemporary as e.g. the last decade. 
We have also contemplated various angles towards the subject like e.g. expanding on 
the historical connotation of the post WWII period in which all three of our primary 
texts was written. This dark period in the history of man must have had a tremendous 
impact on man’s view upon himself and the idea of humanism. This period also gave 
birth to United Nations not to mention Human Rights, which are two other obvious 
perspectives, which we have discussed setting humanism up against. 
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From the human rights we also got to some of the conventional ethical values, like 
respect for human life, which we traditionally have come to associate with 
humanism. This obviously also made us contemplate the ethical angle towards the 
concept, not to mention the first historical connection between these values and the 
word humanism. 
After much debate we ended up deciding on what could be considered the core of the 
issue, i.e. asking ourselves the question: “What is humanism?” 
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13. Summary 
 
I vores rapport har vi analyseret og fortolket tre filosofiske værker skrevet af 
henholdsvis Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger og Ernst Cassirer, hvori de hver især 
giver deres individuelle fortolkning af hvad humanisme er. Ved at gøre dette har vi 
fået større viden om alt det der kan indgå i begrebet humanisme, og vi har lavet 
diskussioner baseret på de tre filosoffers forskellige måder at håndtere ordet 
humanisme på. Vi gør rede for hver af filosoffernes beskrivelse af menneskets 
situation i forhold til verden og til mennesket selv, og endvidere beskriver vi hver 
deres teorier og termer som er en del af hver deres filosofi. På baggrund af 
ovennævnte har vi været i stand til at sammenligne ordet humanisme med mere 
basale ting der indgår i menneskets hverdag. 
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14. Abstract 
 
In our report we have analyzed and interpreted three philosophical works written by 
respectively Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer, in where each of 
their individual interpretation on humanism is given. By doing this we have gained 
more knowledge about all that may be taken into consideration when using the word 
humanism and we have made discussions based on the three philosophers different 
interpretations. We set out each of the three philosopher’s description of man’s 
situation in the world and man’s relation to man. Furthermore we describe each of the 
three philosopher’s terms and theories which are also very important to to each of 
their philosophy. On the background of the above mentioned we have been capable 
of comparing the word humanism with more basic elements that is part of man’s 
everyday-life.         
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